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COWORKER RETALIATION IN THE #METOO ERA
Deborah L. Brake*
I.

INTRODUCTION: #METOO, RETALIATION, AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF COWORKER REACTIONS

For over a year now, the #MeToo movement has spread like
wildfire, galvanizing feminist legal scholars to reconsider how law
should respond to sexual harassment in the workplace and to assess
the potential for #MeToo to change workplace culture.1
In the
feminist legal scholarship considering #MeToo to date, less attention
has been paid to how the movement and its fallout intersect with
retaliation law than to the movement's incongruity with the
substantive law of sexual harassment.2
Given that the fear of
retaliation is a primary reason for not confronting sexual harassment,3
retaliation law necessarily plays an outsized role in shaping responses
to sexual harassment.4 This Article focuses on retaliation as a key
site of inquiry in exploring the transformative potential of #MeToo.
Although the growing strength of #MeToo suggests that social
norms tolerating sexual harassment may be changing, the likelihood
of negative reactions to sexual harassment disclosures remains high.6

*

1.

2.

3.

Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, John E. Murray Faculty
Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
See Lesley Wexler et al., #MeToo, Time's Up, and Theories ofJustice, 2019 U. ILL. L.
REV. 45, 47-48 (explaining that #MeToo caused a "cultural reckoning" and inspired
efforts to "amplify and credit survivors' voices, seek accountability, change
workplace practices, and encourage access to the legal system").
One notable exception is Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting
with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 50 (2018) (arguing that prevention of
retaliation should be the starting point for ending sexual harassment).
Id. (citing U.S. EQUAL EMP'T

OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, REPORT OF THE CO-CHAIRS OF

16
(2016) [hereinafter EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT], https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/taskfor
ce/harassment/upload/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PAY2-WZG8]).
See EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (documenting fear of retaliation
as a primary force suppressing reporting of sexual harassment).
See infra Part III.
See Stefanie K. Johnson et al., Has Sexual Harassment at Work Decreased Since
#MA'eToo?, HARv. Bus. REv. (July 18, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/07/has-sexualharassment-at-work-decreased-since-metoo
[https://perma.cc/EHG2-C7HY]
THE SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
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The psychological and social forces that make retaliation likely
predate #MeToo.' The prevalence of retaliation reflects a common
tendency to blame persons who identify themselves as victims of
discrimination, a tendency that is enhanced by the belief in a just and
meritocratic society.' One troubling finding in the social psychology
literature on this phenomenon is that the inclination to blame persons
who attribute negative outcomes to discrimination is not abated by
reliable evidence that discrimination, in fact, occurred.9 People
ascribe negative qualities to individuals who attribute their failures to
discrimination as opposed to some other hurdle, even when it is
evident that discrimination occurred. 10 To the extent that #MeToo
has bolstered the credibility of women complaining about sexual
harassment, that shift is not likely to reduce retaliatory responses."
Indeed, as the #MeToo movement expands to push the boundaries of
conventional understandings of sexual harms, retaliatory responses
may become even more likely. 12 As socio-legal scholars have
shown, reforms that deviate too far from prevailing understandings of
what constitutes "discrimination" tend to provoke a backlash.13
Evidence suggests that backlash to #MeToo is already ascendant. 14
A recent poll conducted by National Public Radio found that more
than 40% of people surveyed agreed with the statement that #MeToo
has gone too far." One indicator of a growing backlash can be found
in the public response to the Senate hearings on the nomination of

(reporting that negative backlash towards women in the workplace has increased since
the #MeToo movement).
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

12.

13.
14.
15.

See EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (explaining, a year before the

#MeToo movement, the prevalence of social and professional retaliation).
See Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of
Anti-DiscriminationLaw, 96 MINN. L. REv. 1275, 1309 (2012).
See id.
See id.
See id. (concluding that strong evidence of discrimination will not prevent negative
reactions towards victims); see also Johnson et al., supra note 6 (finding that negative
reactions towards women in the workplace have increased since #MeToo).
The controversy over the alleged encounter with Aziz Ansari is a case in point. See
Katie Way, I Went on a Date with Aziz Ansari. It Turned into the Worst Night ofAy
Life, BABE (Jan.
13, 2018), https://babe.net/2018/01/13/aziz-ansari-283 55
[https://perma.cc/XMC2-PRLM].
See Eyer, supra note 8, at 1332.
See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
Tovia Smith, On #MeToo, Americans More Divided by Party than Gender, NAT'L
PUB. RADio (Oct. 31, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/31/662178315/
on-metoo-americans-more-divided-by-party-than-gender
[https://perma.cc/SZ6CNZST] (reporting results of National Public Radio poll finding that more than 40% of
Americans surveyed said the movement had gone too far).
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Brett Kavanaugh to the United States Supreme Court.16 While
reactions were highly polarized, they included pronounced hostility
toward sexual assault accusers writ large." #DefendOurMen became
a mantra of some Kavanaugh supporters, who framed men as the
victims of the #MeToo movement on a rampage to derail the careers
of successful men with bright futures."
As disclosures of sexual harassment continue to flood social
media,1 9 opportunities for negative reactions at work remain
abundant.2 0 It remains to be seen whether Title VII retaliation law is
up to the task.21 One commentator argued that despite a series of
pro-plaintiff retaliation decisions by the Supreme Court in the first
decade of the twenty-first century, more recent developments portend
a judicial backlash in retaliation law in the lower courts.22
In highlighting the importance of retaliation law for the future of
#MeToo, I do not intend to suggest that the retaliation claim has the
potential to capture all, or even most, negative reactions to #MeToo
disclosures at work. The limited scope of retaliation law necessarily
leaves many #MeToo moments outside the law's protection.2 3
Perhaps the most significant limitation is that a complaint of sexual
harassment by someone who is not connected to the workplace is not
protected activity under Title VII.24 Many of the high-profile

16.

See Eugene Scott, Amid Allegations Against Kavanaugh, Worry About the Future of
Boys and Men, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2018, 1:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.co

18.

m/politic s/2018/10/02/amid-allegations-against-kavanaugh-worry-about-future-boysmen/ [https://perma.cc/S2X2-WCZ4].
See generally id. (reporting that reactions to Kavanaugh's nomination were split along
political and gender lines, and that conservative men called for pushback against
accusers' claims).
See id.

19.

#MeToo Floods Social Media with Stories of Sexual Harassment and Abuse, CBS

17.

NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017, 11:57 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/me-too-campaignfloods-social-media-sexual-harassment-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/TF98-SLDF].
20.

21.

22.
23.
24.

See Alex Press, Women Are Filing More Harassment Claims in the #MeToo Era.
They're Also Facing More Retaliation, Vox (May 9, 2019, 3:50 PM),

https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/20 19/5/9/18541982/sexual-harassment-me-tooeeoc-complaints [https://perma.cc/PXH7-5DCX].
Cf Alex B. Long, Retaliation Backlash, 93 WASH. L. REV. 715, 717-18 (2018)
(discussing whether Title VII retaliation law is effective at protecting workplace
retaliation).
See id. at 715, 717, 723-24, 726-27.
Cf id at 717-19 (discussing how the courts narrowly interpret Title VII retaliation
law).
See Joshua Colangelo-Bryan, "Title VII Retaliation Claims: What Constitutes
Protected Activity?, " New York Law Journal, DORSEY (Mar. 9, 2004),
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#MeToo disclosures were from women who were not employed at
the site where they were sexually harassed, or were not sexually
harassed by a person working for their employer. 25 For example, the
Harvey Weinstein allegations that sparked outrage came from women
who were not employed by the Weinstein Corporation at the time.2 6
Similarly, many #MeToo reports about workplace harassment came
from women who had long since left the place of employment where
the abuse occurred. 27
This is not surprising because fear of
retaliation prevents many women from speaking up about sexual
harassment and other forms of discrimination, while they are still
employed.2 8

Of course, Title VII's limited scope in covering only the
employment setting in which the harassment occurred is not unique
to the #MeToo setting.2 9 Protection from retaliation has never
extended to blacklisting by future employers.30 The plaintiff in the
Supreme Court's first sexual harassment case, Mechelle Vinson,
experienced this first-hand when she was unable to find employment

https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/2004/03/title-vii-retaliationclaims-what-constitutes-pr
[https://perma.cc/U6RA-4747].
25.

See Alex Johnson, Judge Again Throws Out Ashley Judd's Sexual HarassmentClaim
Against Harvey Weinstein, NBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2019, 9:53 PM), https://www.nbcnews

.com/storyline/harvey-weinstein-scandal/judge-again-throws-out-ashley-judd-ssexual-harassment-claim-n957011 [https://perma.cc/B7GE-4JPE]; see also Ashley
Louszko et al., Rose McGowan Describes Alleged Rape by Harvey Weinstein, Her
Thoughts on the Hollywood 'System', ABC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2018, 3:20 PM),

https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/rose-mcgowan-describes-alleged-rape-harveyweinstein-thoughts/story?id=52684109 [https://perma.cc/X5RV-EMTK].
26.
27.

See sources cited supra note 25.
See Suzy Stutner, How to Report Sexual Harassmentat a PreviousJob, HUFFINGTON

POST (Dec. 2, 2017, 9:07 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-to-report-sexualharassment-at-old-job_n_5a2190ade4b03c44072d5077
[https://perma.cc/VDX2B2YL].
28.

See Maya Raghu, We Can't Stop Sexual HarassmentWithout Addressing Retaliation,
NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CTR. (Jan. 23, 2018), https://nwlc.org/blog/we-cant-stop-sexual-

harassment-without-addressing-retaliation/ [https://perma.cc/35TW-LM5L].
29.

See Bryce Covert, Actresses-andMillions of Other Workers-Have No FederalSexual
HarassmentProtections,NATION (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/

article/actresses-and-millions-of-other-workers-have-no-federal-sexual-harassmentprotections/ [https://perma.cc/J3FQ-TJT9]; cf Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 63, 66 (1986) (holding that Title VII applies to sexual harassment by
employers against employees).
30.

Cf Tanya Kateri Hernandez, "Uhat Not to Wear" Race and Unwelcomeness in
Sexual HarassmentLaw: The Story of Aeritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in WOMEN
AND THE LAW STORIES 277, 292-93 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M.

Wildman eds., 2011) (discussing the story of Mechelle Vinson, who was "blacklisted
in the banking industry" after she filed a sexual harassment suit against her employer).
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in the banking industry after suing her employer, Meritor Savings
Bank, for sexual harassment.3 1 Although hardly a new problem, Title
VII's limited reach may have broader repercussions as the path
widens, through newer forms of mass communication, for calling out
sexual harassment that is not tied to the accuser's current place of
employment. 32
But the importance of retaliation law in connection with the
#MeToo movement transcends the law's scope of protection for the
new strain of #MeToo disclosures.3 3 #MeToo has sparked a cultural
reckoning with sexual harassment that promises to spur more
outspoken opposition to sexual harassment in the workplace; 3 4 and
the beginnings of a #MeToo backlash signal that many of these
challenges to sexual harassment at work will prompt retaliation in
response.3 5 Title VII's capacity to respond commensurately is of
paramount importance to the strength of #MeToo and the
movement's potential to spark increased opposition to sexual
harassment at work.3 6
Of equal importance to protecting complainants is the expressive
force of retaliation law in messaging and norm-setting about
appropriate, non-retaliatory responses to sexual harassment
complaints. 37 The fallout from #MeToo requires the law to grapple
anew with questions about what kinds of reactions are retaliatory and
what obligations employers have to encourage a non-retaliatory tone
and to police negative reactions. 38 As Title VII law contends with
these questions, employers will respond with their understanding of
the law, sending signals about proper boundaries and incorporating
their understandings into their workplace policies and training
materials. 39
One notable attribute of the #MeToo movement is that it has
proceeded as an extra-legal channel for addressing sexual harms and
seeking accountability. 40 Indeed, the movement stands as a scathing

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 293.
supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
infra Part III.
supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.

36.
37.
38.
39.

See
See
See
See

infra notes 455-63, 466-68 and accompanying text.
infra notes 512-14 and accompanying text.
infra notes 486-500 and accompanying text.
infra notes 492-501, 505-06, 508, 513-14 and accompanying text.

40.

See Catharine A. MacKinnon, U/here #MeToo Came From, and Where It's Going,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/
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critique of law, its very strength serving as a stark indicator of the
failure of law to eradicate sexual harassment. 4 1 The movement's
echoes amplify critiques from within legal discourse, such as Tristin
Green's recent missive, asking "Was Sexual Harassment Law a
Mistake?" 42 Green faults legal doctrine for distorting and diluting the
stories that women tell of sexual harassment, 43 as in the foundational
case against Meritor Savings Bank in which Mechelle Vinson was
forced to articulate her case as the story of one victim of one sexual
harasser.44 The institutional hierarchy that marginalized women in
lower status positions, and enabled men such as the Vice President of
the bank to pervasively abuse power, was obscured. 45 The court did
not permit Mechelle Vinson to bring in the stories of other women
harassed by the bank Vice President, Sidney Taylor, making her own
story resemble a romance-gone-wrong, and eclipsing some of the
more pernicious and institutionally ingrained elements of the abuse.4 6
It is easier to discount women's stories when they appear
aberrational 47 -and all the more so for women of color. 48 In the
wake of sexual harassment law's failures, 49 #MeToo intervenes as
both a corrective and a critique; its power residing in the collective,
the "me too."so
Precisely because of its extra-legal position, #MeToo is more
dependent on the law of retaliation than the scope of sexual
harassment law for its continued strength. 1 Protecting the space for
sharing stories and initiating conversations about sexual harassment
may be more important than expanding the reach of what counts as
actionable sexual harassment at work. 52 Ensuring this protection is
of the utmost importance because the movement's power has been

41.
42.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.

catharine-mackinnon-what-metoo-has-changed/585313/
[https://perma.cc/RVG9WCVG].
See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
See Tristan K. Green, Was Sexual HarassmentLaw a Aistake? The Stories We Tell,
128 YALE L.J. FORUM 152, 153-54 (June 18, 2018), https://www.yalelawjoumal.org/
forum/was-sexual-harassment-law-mistake [https://perma.cc/RVG9-WCVG].
See id. at 153.
See id. at 160-61.
See id. at 154-55.
See id. at 160.
See id. at 154.
See Alicia Sanchez Gill et al., Women and Girls of Color Need Justice Too, REWIRE
NEWS (Jan. 14, 2019, 11:16 AM), https://rewire.news/article/2019/01/14/women-andgirls-of-color-need-justice-too/ [https://perma.cc/VMN7-6E8J].
See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
See MacKinnon, supra note 40.
See infra notes 52-79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 53-79 and accompanying text.

Coworker Retaliation

2019]

7

acquired through the telling of people's stories and in the collective
opposition to sexual harassment it engenders, as the mover of
norms. 53

One type of retaliation in particular, coworker retaliation, has
escaped the attention of #MeToo scholarship.54
Already
underdeveloped as a species of retaliation law, coworker retaliation
has important implications for #MeToo for several reasons. 5 First,
the Supreme Court's decision in Vance v. Ball State University56
means that many employees with day-to-day supervisory
responsibilities over other workers will be treated as coworkers and
not as supervisors for the purposes of employer liability for
retaliatory harassment. 7
Although Vance's holding addressed
employer liability for sexual harassment, its reasoning fully extends
to retaliatory harassment as well. 5 ' After Vance, more retaliatory
conduct that Title VII otherwise might have captured as retaliation by
a supervisor will now fall under the murkier legal standards
applicable to coworker retaliation.5 9
A second reason for focusing on coworker retaliation in relation to
#MeToo is that coworker reactions are an important yet often
overlooked influence on both the targets of sexual harassment and the
harassers. 6 0 Having the support of coworkers greatly increases the
likelihood that a victim will report incidents of harassment.6 1
Conversely, a lack of coworker support can make employees more

53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See MacKinnon, supra note 40.
See infra Part II.
See infra notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013) (holding "that an employee is a
'supervisor' for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he or she is
empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim").
See id. at 431.
See id.
See id.
See infra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
See Naomi Schoenbaum, Towards a Law of Coworkers, 68 ALA. L. REv. 605, 609,
621-24 (2017) (discussing the importance of coworker support for employee
willingness to report misconduct and harassment in the workplace); see also Shankar
Vedantam, iWhy Now?, NAT'L PUB. RADio (July 27, 2018, 6:16 PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyld=633199277
[https://perma.cc/T4BV-2NRS] (interviewing political scientist Timur Kuran about
the phenomenon of "preference falsification"-the belief that your experience runs
counter to public opinion-and psychology professor Betsy Paluck on "social
proof'-looking at reactions to persons who have spoken as precedent for what would
happen if you did-in exploring the question of why women do and do not speak up
about sexual harassment and abuse).
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vulnerable to harassment and more likely to be harassed.6 2 For the
potential harasser, the perception that they have coworker support for
their conduct is a significant factor in their likelihood of engaging in
sexual assault and harassment.6 3 When coworkers support the
harasser and react negatively to sexual harassment disclosures, it
contributes to a workplace culture that normalizes harassment and
chills reporting.6 4
Coworker retaliation also has pronounced harms on the persons
targeted.6 5
Although retaliation law prioritizes retaliation by
supervisors,66 coworkers can be an equally powerful force in
establishing cultures of silence and discrimination. 67 A recent article
by Catherine Albiston and Tristin Green uses the term "social closure
discrimination," drawing on Max Weber's theory of social closure,6 8
to explain the discriminatory harms that result when people draw
boundaries and construct identities to bolster their ingroup, and then
accumulate resources and status by excluding others. 69 Albiston and
Green critique the substantive law of employment discrimination for
its failure to capture the phenomenon of social closure at work. 70 A
similar phenomenon results when people side with harassers over
complainants and close ranks around the accused.7 1 Retaliation, as
much as discrimination, can reinforce ingroup identities, and
coworkers, no less than supervisors, can enforce social closure.72
Even without formally delegated power, coworkers can close ranks
and exclude others from key informal networks, which are integral to

62.

See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 625.

63.

Cf Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for

64.
65.

Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 69-78 (2002) (discussing the importance of
coworkers in preventing or encouraging harassment and discrimination).
See id. at 69-75 (explaining the consequences of coworkers supporting a harasser in
the workplace).
See infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.

66.
67.
68.

See Long, supra note 21, at 719-23.
See Zatz, supra note 63, at 69-75.
Catharine Albiston & Tristin K. Green, Social Closure Discrimination, 39 BERKELEY

J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 2, 12 (2018).
69.
70.

See id. at 4-22.
See id. at 23-34.

71.

See Zatz, supra note 63, at 69-75; see Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough Is It
to Change a Culture of Harassment? Ask Women at Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19,

2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/20 17/12/19/us/ford-chicago-sexualharassment.html [https://perma.cc/68LF-3BBK] (describing women's allegations that
they were "mocked, dismissed, threatened and ostracized" for complaining, called a
"snitch bitch," and accused of "raping the company").
72.

See Zatz, supra note 63, at 69-75; see Chira & Einhorn, supra note 71.
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job success.7 3 A New York Times magazine article on the saga of
sexual harassment at a Ford motor plant in Chicago offers a poignant
illustration of how retaliation and sexual harassment intertwine to
create social closure, largely by coworkers.74 Women who worked at
the plant, many of whom were women of color, suffered protracted
and escalating harassment that was both sexually (and often racially)
explicit and retaliatory, enforcing a culture of silence and submission
for those who stayed.
The use of social media to spread #MeToo disclosures makes
coworker reactions all the more likely to affect workplace culture.76
Coworkers may be especially likely to see and react to social media
disclosures, sometimes supportively, sometimes negatively, because
of the sprawling connections on Facebook, Twitter, and other
platforms that draw acquaintances from work into each other's social
media orbits. What may begin as venting on social media can cross
over into traditional channels of opposition to sexual harassment at
work.7 8
The connectedness of colleagues through social media
creates an integrated web of knowledge and social norms that can
easily spill over into the workplace.7 9
For all of these reasons, #MeToo is on a collision course with the
nascent law of coworker retaliation.so Despite its significance to
workplace culture, coworker retaliation has long been the poor
stepchild of Title VII retaliation law." The doctrine on coworker
retaliation is less developed and rarely the subject of study.8 2 This
Article takes a closer look at coworker retaliation and considers how
emerging lessons from #MeToo might be productively brought to
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See Albiston & Green, supra note 68, at 9.
See Chira & Einhom, supra note 71.
See id.
See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
See generally Lisa A. Mainiero & Kevin J. Jones, Workplace Romance 2.0:
Developing a Communication Ethics Model to Address Potential Sexual Harassment
from InappropriateSocial Media Contacts Between Coworkers, 114 J. Bus. ETHICS
367, 368 (2013) ("The use of new social media technologies such as Facebook,
Linkedln, and Twitter . . . have created situations where some employees complain
another employee may have created a hostile environment for them outside the office
which then impacts their behavior inside the office."); see generally Christopher E.
Parker, Rising Tide of Social Media, 58 FED. LAW. 14, 14 (2011) (explaining the vast
number of individuals who communicate on social media platforms).
See Mainiero & Jones, supra note 77, at 368.
See id.
See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.

10

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

bear on the development of Title VII law as applied to coworker
retaliation for opposition to sexual harassment.8 3 Because of the role
coworker reactions play in individual decisions about whether to
speak up about personal experience with sexual harassment,8 4
retaliation law's response to coworker retaliation has an integral
relation to the #MeToo movement." This Article explores several
fault lines in the doctrine governing employer responsibility for
coworker retaliation that may affect-and potentially hinder-the
transformative impact of #MeToo in the workplace.8 6
II.

UNCERTAINTIES AND GAPS IN TITLE VII'S COVERAGE
OF COWORKER RETALIATION

Title VII has long been in need of an overhaul of its framework for
addressing coworker retaliation." While other aspects of retaliation
have given rise to sustained attention and Supreme Court decisions,
the law governing coworker retaliation remains underdeveloped."
Even without #MeToo, the Vance decision, which narrows the
category of "supervisor" and leaves more retaliatory actions in the
realm of coworker retaliation, harkens a shift in the paradigmatic
retaliation case.8 9 #MeToo makes lingering questions about the law's
treatment of coworker retaliation all the more pressing. This Article
takes a closer look at three doctrines that pose difficulties for Title
VII's applicability to coworker retaliation: the standard of employer
liability; 9 0 the extent of severity required to reasonably chill a
complainant; 9 1 and the parsing of retaliatory causation from sexbased motivation.92 This section considers each issue in turn.9 3

83.
84.
85.

See infra Parts II-III.
See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 621-22.
See infra Part III.

86.
87.

See infra Part II.
See Donna Lenhoff, The #MeToo Movement Will Be in Vain if We Don't Mlake These

88.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Changes, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the
-metoo-movement-will-be-in-vain-if-we-dont-make-these-changes/2018/01/25/5add9
5a8-0090-1 1e8-8acf-ad2991367d9d story html [https://perma.cc/FVT3-MGPS].
See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless LP, 562 U.S. 170, 172 (2011); see Crawford v.
Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 279 (2009); see CBOCS W. v. Humphries,
553 U.S. 442, 452 (2008); see Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 490 (2008); see
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 70 (2006).
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 450 (2013).
See discussion infra Section II.A.
See discussion infra Section II.B.
See discussion infra Section II.C.
See discussion infra Sections II.A-C.
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Employer Liabilityfor Coworker Retaliation

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's attention to retaliation cases
in recent years,9 4 employer responsibility for retaliatory actions by
coworkers remains a muddle.95 Clarity about employer liability for
coworker retaliation is important not only for litigating individual
cases, but also for incentivizing employers to prevent retaliatory
actions and promote workplace cultures that enable employees to
oppose discrimination.9 6 Without guidance from the Supreme Court,
lower courts have varied greatly in how they apply Title VII to
retaliation by coworkers.9 7
Among the more skeptical courts, the Fifth Circuit stands out. 9 8 It
has long resisted an interpretation of Title VII that would protect
complainants from retaliation by coworkers. 99 in order for coworker
retaliation to give rise to an actionable claim, the Fifth Circuit
requires a plaintiff to prove that the coworker's actions were
undertaken "in furtherance of the employer's business.""oo To meet
this standard, there must be a "direct relationship" between the
retaliatory acts by coworkers and the employer's business
interests. 101 Coworker retaliation must serve the employer's business
in order for the employer to be responsible for taking corrective
action.102

Both the standard itself and the way courts apply it are troubling in
the #MeToo era of escalating reports of sexual harassment. 103 The
Fifth Circuit's standard posits a sharp distinction between retaliation
that does and does not serve the employer's business interests. 104
The difficulty is not just that there is no bright line between these two
poles, but that there is no line whatsoever.10
Any action that
discourages employees from complaining about sexual harassment
can be said to serve the interest of the employer in maintaining a

94.

See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation
Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REv. 917, 923 (2009).

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See infra notes 100-36, 153-242 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 285-90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 100-36, 153-242 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 99-151 and accompanying text.
See Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id.
See id.
See infra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
See Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657.
See id.
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placid workforce that tolerates whatever sexual misconduct is
encountered. 106 The employer strategy of "divide and conquer" is a
tried and true tactic of employers seeking to remain unconstrained by
unions and other collective action demands.107 At least in the short
run, chilling complaints may serve the employer's business interests
by enforcing loyalty to the organization rather than to an employee's
contrary expectations or ideals about what employees should have to
tolerate. 108 When troublemakers are silenced, the employer can
proceed with business as usual. 109
The Fifth Circuit rule
misunderstands how retaliatory workplace dynamics of divisiveness
may, at least in the short term, serve profit-making goals, and that
employers may benefit from inter-group dissension and conflict
among workers. 110
As courts have applied the Fifth Circuit's rule, it is not enough for
plaintiffs to argue that retaliation serves the employer's interest in
maintaining a placid and divided workforce.' Something more is
required, and it is not clear what connections between the retaliatory
acts and the employer's business interests could possibly suffice. 1 12
The Fifth Circuit's liability standard appears to import a principle of
agency law approximating scope of employment.1 1 3 Adopting scope
of employment for coworker retaliation, however, sets an
insurmountable hurdle. 114 Under the Supreme Court's discussion of
the scope of employment doctrine in Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth,11 ' scope of employment is a narrow construct, excluding
even supervisors' sexual harassment as the equivalent of a frolic and
detour. 116 Claims for coworker retaliation would fare no better under

106.
107.
108.

109.
110.
111.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id.
See Eric A. Posner et al., Divide and Conquer, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYsis 417, 438-40
(2010).
See Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Frances J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A
Barrier to Change and Development in a Pluralistic World, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
706, 719 (2000).
See id. at 716-17.
See Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657.
See Green v. Trimac Transp. S., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-444, 2012 WL 12893293, at *1617 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2012); see Sapp v. Potter, No. 1:07-CV-00650, 2012 WL
3890259, at *10-11 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2012), aff'd Sapp v. Donohoe, 539 F. App'x
590 (5th Cir. 2013).
See Green, 2012 WL 12893293, at *16-17; see Sapp, 2012 WL 3890259, at *10-11.
See Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657.
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1998).
See id.
See id.
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this understanding of the scope of employment."' As long as the
retaliating coworker is not acting in an agency capacity for the
employer, it is difficult to fathom how a plaintiff could show that the
retaliation directly furthers the employer's business in this sense."'
The Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Vance v. Ball State
University makes threading the Fifth Circuit's needle all the more
difficult.1 19 In Vance, the Court restricted the definition of a
supervisor for the purposes of applying the employer liability
framework adopted in Ellerth for sexual harassment by a
supervisor. 1 2 0
Only persons with authority to take a tangible
employment action against the plaintiff qualify as supervisors; 12 1 it is
not enough to have day-to-day control over the plaintiffs work
assignments and job conditions. 1 2 2 Although Vance considered this
question in the context of employer liability for racial harassment, 1 23
the Court's reasoning is equally applicable to the question of who
qualifies as a supervisor for purposes of retaliation law. 124
In the Fifth Circuit, the combination of Vance and the "must serve
the employer's business" rule is deadly for plaintiffs bringing claims
for coworker retaliation. 125
By narrowing the category of
"supervisor" in a retaliation case, the employer liability standard for
coworker harassment will apply to a broad swath of retaliatory
conduct. 126 Not only does Vance mean that the legal standards
governing coworker retaliation will govern a larger class of cases, it
also interacts with the Fifth Circuit's liability standard for coworker
retaliation in troubling ways, further winnowing the chances for
meeting the further-the-employer's business standard. 127

117.

See Elizabeth A. Cramer, Taking Matters into Their Own Hands: RetaliatoryActions
by Coworkers and the Fifth Circuit'sNarrow Standardfor Employer Liability, 82 U.

118.
119.

CiN. L. REV. 591, 600-01 (2014).
See id. at 601.
See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431-32 (2013).

120.
121.

See id.
See id.

122.

See id. at 449-50.

123.
124.

See id. at 425.
See Elizabeth Lee, Simplicity v. Reality in the Workplace: Balancing the Aims of
Vance v. Ball State University and the FairEmployment ProtectionAct, 67 HASTINGS

125.
126.
127.

L.J. 1769, 1773-74, 1786 (2016).
See infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
See Vance, 570 U.S. at 453-54, 466-68 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012); see also
Lakisha A. Davis, Who's the Boss? A Distinction Without a Difference, 19 BARRY L.

REv. 155, 167 (2013) (considering when the harasser is not a supervisor, "then an
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One post-Vance decision by the Fifth Circuit, Spencer v. Schmidt
Electric Co., traces the narrow path left for challenging retaliation by
coworkers. 1 28 The plaintiff, an apprentice on a job site, was racially
harassed by two foremen who oversaw his work. 1 29 In addition to
making repeated racist comments, the foremen texted the plaintiff a
picture of a white Santa Clause wearing a white hood, holding a
noose, and standing in front of a burning cross. 13 0 After the plaintiff
complained to his union steward, the foremen cornered him in a
room, blocked him from leaving and intimidated him, and asked him
whom else he had told about the offending text message.13 1 The
appellate court did not address whether the incident met the standard
of severity required for actionable retaliation (the district court held it
did not) because even if it did, the employer was not liable for the
foremen's actions because they did not act as agents of the
employer. 13 2 Although the foremen had day-to-day supervisory
control over the plaintiff and could recommend his dismissal, they
did not have the ultimate authority to take tangible employment
actions and so they were not considered "supervisors" under
Vance.133 Because the foremen lacked the power to hire or fire the
plaintiff, the court reasoned their conduct was not in furtherance of
the employer's interest. 13 4 The court did not address whether the
employer might be held responsible under some other fault-based
standard, but the court's reasoning appeared to foreclose that
result.1 35 As the court explained the law, a plaintiff "must establish
that the employer was effectively the intimidator, and 'that the desire
to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment
action."13

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

employee's only recourse is to prove the employer's liability under the negligence
standard").
See Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x. 442, 447-50 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id at 444.
Id. The plaintiff also saw nooses left around the work site, was mocked about the
quality of his work, and was required to repeat tasks for no apparent reason. Id.
Id. at 444, 449.
See id. at 448-50.
See id. at 447-48.
See id. at 449-50.
See id. at 450.
Id. at 449 (emphasis added) (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.
338, 352 (2013)). One judge dissented in regard to the retaliation claim on the
grounds that the majority was too quick to say that the foremen were not supervisors
as a matter of law because the issue appeared to be a question of fact. See id at 45253, 455 (Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The combination of applying Vance's definition of a supervisor to
retaliation law, 13 7 and then limiting the class of persons whose
retaliatory acts may occur within the scope of employment to
supervisors,13 creates a de facto bar to employer liability for
retaliatory acts by coworkers.13 9 "[A]ny alleged retaliation must be
by the employer," 14 0 the court proclaimed in Spencer, explaining that
employers are only liable "in accordance with common law agency
principles, for the acts of employees committed in furtherance of the
employer's business." 14 1 With "agent" defined narrowly to conform
to the definition of a supervisor empowered to take tangible
employment action, 14 2 the court's reasoning shows how Vance,
combined with the requirement that the retaliator act in furtherance of
the employer's business, sets an insurmountable hurdle to
establishing employer liability for coworker retaliation. 143
A recent decision from a district court in the Fifth Circuit put it
even more starkly: "The actions of ordinary employees are not
imputable to" the employer. 14 4 Instead, there must be "a direct
relationship" between the retaliatory act and the employer's
business. 145 Predictably, the retaliation claim failed in that case
because the plaintiff could not show that the coworker retaliation
occurred in furtherance of the employer's business, because the
coworker did not act as an agent of the employer. 1 4 6 The circularity
of the rule did not deter the court from applying it. 1 4 7
The Fifth Circuit's liability standard reflects a narrow, formalistic
understanding of organizational
power, holding employers
accountable only for abuses of power by persons with the delegated
authority to take tangible employment actions, such as hiring and

137.
138.

Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 43 1-32 (2013).
See Spencer, 576 F. App'x. at 447-50.

139.

See supra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.

140.
141.
142.

Spencer, 576 F. App'x at 449.
Id. (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)).
See id. at 448-50.

143.

See supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.

144.

145.

Beard v. Yamane, No. 3:14-CV-2828, 2015 WL 1525076, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2,
2015) (plaintiffs retaliation claim failed where plaintiff did not allege that the
retaliating coworkers "were anything other than ordinary employees or that their
alleged retaliatory harassment was committed in furtherance of [defendant's]
business").
Id. (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)).

146.

See id.

147.

See id.
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firing. 148

Other abuses of power are viewed as separate from the
employer's interests. 149 This approach rejects any potentially broader
fault-based liability standards, leaving vicarious liability as the only
possible path to employer liability."o This approach recognizes
formal delegations of tangible employment actions as the only form
of power that matters for employer accountability and neglects the
importance of both formal and informal power over day-to-day
responsibilities and the workplace environment."
Although the Fifth Circuit is the most restrictive in its approach to
coworker retaliation, other circuits have also imposed tougher limits
on employer liability for coworker retaliation than they apply to
sexual harassment by coworkers, albeit with some uncertainty about
the extent of the difference.1 52 The Eighth Circuit's evolution in its
treatment of coworker retaliation illustrates the difficulties courts
have faced in calibrating an approach to employer liability for
coworker retaliation.1 53 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 154 the Eighth
Circuit refused to recognize a retaliation claim based on coworker
harassment, on the grounds that retaliation by coworkers could not
amount to a materially adverse employment action."' After the
Burlington Northern decision, in which the Supreme Court held the
materially adverse doctrine under § 703 of Title VII to be
inapplicable to a retaliation claim under § 704,156 the Eighth Circuit
changed course. The court ruled that coworker retaliation may be
actionable if it is sufficiently severe to chill a reasonable employee
from complaining but applied a different employer liability standard
than the negligence standard governing coworker harassment
claims. 117
For coworker retaliation to be actionable, the Eighth Circuit
explained, the plaintiff must prove that the employer's failure to take
reasonable corrective action was because of the plaintiffs
participation in the protected activity.' In the case announcing this
rule, the plaintiff, who was white, was racially harassed for having
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App'x 442, 449-50 (5th Cir. 2014).
See id. at 449.
See id.
See id.
See infra notes 153-96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
See Manning v. Met Life, 127 F.3d 686, 692-93 (8th Cir. 1997).
See BurlingtonN., 548 U.S. at 57.
See Carpenter v. Con-Way Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611, 618 (8th Cir. 2007).
See id. at 619.
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married a black woman.15 9
After he complained about the
harassment, and after he testified in a racial harassment case brought
by an African American coworker, a white coworker retaliated
against him.160 The court granted summary judgment to the
employer, reasoning that because the plaintiff could not show that the
employer's failure to respond to the coworker's harassing conduct
was motivated by the plaintiffs protected conduct, the employer
could not be held liable for the coworker's retaliation.1 6 1 The
difference between this rule for coworker retaliation and the standard
of liability for coworker sexual harassment is apparent. 162 Employer
liability for coworker harassment stems from the employer's failure
to take appropriate corrective action once the employer is on notice
of the harassment, with no requirement to prove that the employer's
failure to respond was motivated by the plaintiffs protected class. 163
Employer liability for sexual harassment is grounded in a theory of
negligence based on the employer's failure to reasonably respond
once on notice of the harassment, 164 while the court's approach to
coworker retaliation rests on a theory of intentional wrongdoing. 165
Other circuits have also required some showing of employer intent
or wrongdoing beyond mere negligence to support employer liability
for coworker harassment. 166 A leading example is the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College.167 The
plaintiff there alleged that she was sexually harassed by two
individuals she worked for and then experienced retaliation for
complaining, including sabotage of her work, worse assignments, and
other unfair treatment by coworkers. 168 The district court instructed
the jury that the plaintiff had the burden to prove that the employer's
retaliatory actions constituted intentional discrimination. 169 The
plaintiff challenged the instruction on appeal, arguing that it
incorrectly foreclosed a retaliation claim predicated on coworker
retaliation.17 0 The Tenth Circuit agreed that coworker retaliation can
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id. at 614.
See id. at 614-15.
See id. at 614.
See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 338 (6th Cir. 2008).
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 542 U.S. 742, 759 (1998).
See Carpenter, 481 F.3d at 618.
See infra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1257.
See id. at 1263.
See id. at 1262.
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be the basis for employer liability, but disagreed with the plaintiffs
argument that the standard for employer liability in such cases is
mere negligence." The court explained that:
[B]ecause harassment must be intentional on the part of the
employer, we hold that an employer can only be liable for
coworkers' retaliatory harassment where its supervisory or
management personnel either (1) orchestrate the harassment
or (2) know about the harassment and acquiesce in it in such
a manner as to condone and encourage the coworkers'
actions. 172
The court's intent-based approach differs in two respects from a
pure negligence standard: first, constructive knowledge of the
retaliation is not enough, 173 and second, the employer's fault must
exceed a mere failure to respond and reach the level of encouraging
the coworkers' retaliatory actions. 17 4 A district court in the Tenth
Circuit later described this liability standard as recognizing a Title
VII claim for coworker retaliation "in a very limited context."1 75
A post-Gunnell district court decision from the Tenth Circuit
reveals the distance between the "condone or encourage" standard
and a pure negligence standard. 176 In Ferguson v. Associated
Wholesale Grocers, Inc.,"7 after experiencing severe and persistent
sexual harassment from a colleague at work, the plaintiff reported the
sexual harassment to a supervisor.178
The supervisor helpfully
responded that he would help her out if she had sex with him. 1 7 9
Eventually, after the plaintiff pursued other channels, the employer
investigated her allegations, found them substantiated, and fired the

171.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See id. at 1264-66. The court's opinion, decided before Burlington Northern, first
grappled with the question of whether coworker retaliation can ever be an adverse
action, concluding that it may, if sufficiently severe. See id. at 1264 (citing Berry v.
Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986-87 (10th Cir. 1996)) (finding a coworker's
initiation of a criminal complaint against the plaintiff, at management's direction, in
retaliation for complaining about discrimination, was an adverse action).
Id. at 1265.
See id.
See id
Farrierv. Nicholson, No. CIV-06-825-D, 2008 WL 1882848, at *10 (W.D. Okla. Apr.
24, 2008).
See generally Ferguson v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 961,
971-72 (D. Kan. 2007).
Id at 961.
See id at 964.
See id.
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harasser.1 so That was only the beginning of the plaintiffs ordeal,
however."' When she returned to work after being placed on paid
administrative leave, 18 2 she was harassed for having the harasser
fired.18 3 Her tires were slashed, she received threatening phone calls
from inside the warehouse where she worked, and she was the
subject of hostile epithets (including such gems as "'whore', 'bitch',
'slut' and 'liar"').1 8 4 At one point, two cans of soda were thrown at
her when she turned away, and one of them hit her in the back.'
Aware of the retaliatory harassment, the employer offered to reassign
her to a position outside the warehouse until things "settled down."186
She did not want to be reassigned, however, and pressed the
employer to investigate and take corrective action.' The employer
instead offered to install a listening device on the plaintiffs home
phone to try to intercept retaliatory phone calls.'
The plaintiff
declined this option too, choosing instead to install a call blocker to
block calls from the number used to make the retaliatory phone
calls.18 9 Because the plaintiff did not know the identity of the
retaliators (even the name calling was behind her back from a
distance in the warehouse, and she could not see the perpetrators nor
recognize their voices), the employer claimed that there was little it
could do.190 The employer did hold a meeting to reiterate its policy
against retaliation, but it did not investigate or interview anyone to
try to identify the retaliatory harassers.191 Despite these failings, the
court granted summary judgment to the employer on the retaliation
claim. 192
Applying the liability standard from Gunnell, the court explained
that an employer is liable for coworker retaliation only when
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See id. at 966-67.
See id. at 967.
Id. at 966. The employer placed the plaintiff-not the accused harasser-on
administrative leave while it investigated her allegations. Id
See id. at 967.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 967-68.
See id. at 968.
Id. at 971-72. However, the court denied the employer's motion for summary
judgment on the sexual harassment claim for failure to establish the applicable
affirmative defense because the plaintiff reported the harassment without any
unreasonable delay. Id at 970.
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supervisory or management personnel either orchestrated the
retaliation or knew about it and acquiesced so as to condone and
encourage it.193 The court rejected the plaintiffs theory of liability
that the employer knew of the retaliation, failed to investigate, and
"threw up [its] hands" because it did not already know the identity of
the perpetrators. 19 4 instead, the court found that the employer took
enough responsive actions to dispel any inference that it condoned or
encouraged the retaliation.1 9 5 By rejecting mere negligence, the
"encourage or condone" standard effectively demands a showing of
wrongdoing akin to intentionality. 1 9 6
Not all courts explicitly treat coworker retaliation more stringently
than coworker harassment, however, in marking the boundaries of
employer liability. 1 9 7
The courts most receptive to coworker
retaliation claims borrow the familiar "knew or should have known"
negligence-based standard from coworker sexual harassment cases
and extend it to cases involving retaliation by coworkers. 198 These
courts justify this choice in terms of the similarity between the two
forms of coworker misconduct. 19 9 An influential case from the Sixth
Circuit announced its decision to hold employers liable for failing to
take reasonable remedial action in response to known retaliatory
harassment in a case that revealed the blurriness of the line separating
coworker retaliation from coworker harassment. 2 0 0 In the oft-cited
case of Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, three women claimed they were
sexually harassed by the same male coworker, and one of them,
along with a fourth woman, sued for retaliation based on retaliatory
conduct by the same coworker. 2 0 1 The facts stand out because of the
virulence of both the sexual harassment and the subsequent
retaliation.2 0 2

193.

Id at 9 71.

194.
195.

Id. at 971-72.
See id. at 971. The court cited the employer's actions of offering to install a phone
tracking device, offering to transfer her out of the warehouse, calling a meeting to
inform employees of its policy against retaliation, viewing the security tapes to,
unsuccessfully, try to ascertain who threw the soda cans, and granting the plaintiff a
leave of absence after the soda incident. Id.
Id.; see also supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 198-217 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 214-28 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 225-36 and accompanying text.
See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 347 (6th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 326. Although they filed suit under Ohio's antidiscrimination statute, the court
borrowed from Title VII, noting that the state statute tracked Title VII. Id. at 332.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See id. at 327-44.
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The coworker was a serial sexual harasser, accosting and lewdly
propositioning multiple women. 20 3 After one of the women reported
his conduct and it was under investigation, someone set fire to her
car. 204 She suspected it was the harasser and reported it to the
employer. 2 05 The employer never investigated the car fire, however,
and instead faulted the woman for accusing her male coworker of
setting fire to the car without proof that he did it. 2 06 Meanwhile, the
employer's sexual harassment investigation determined that the
coworker sexually harassed two of the women.20 7 Nevertheless, the
employer took no disciplinary action against him at that time,
ostensibly because, when the employer previously attempted to fire
him for prior sexual harassment, the harasser was granted
reinstatement after filing a grievance with the union. 2 08 Even though
the employer's own sexual harassment investigator found that the
more recent allegations of sexual harassment likely occurred, the
company told the complaining woman that it could not "substantiate"
her allegations. 2 09 Eventually, after more women came forward with
similar allegations, the coworker was finally terminated for sexual
harassment, and the union grievance committee upheld the
termination.2 1 0 Soon after the harasser was fired, one of the women
had gasoline poured into her basement and her house set on fire.21 1
At that point, an investigation began into the two fires (the car fire
and the house fire).2 12 While that investigation was underway, the
coworker, who was fired for sexual harassment, shot his girlfriend
and killed himself.2 13
The Sixth Circuit held that an employer may be liable for
"manifest[] indifference or unreasonableness" in response to

203.

Id. at 327-31.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

211.

Id. at 329.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 331. One of the supervisors told the investigator that the alleged harasser's
"primary target is single black women." Id. Perhaps that explains why it took so
many women complaining about the coworker's sexual harassment to get him fired.
Id. at 327-28. Catharine MacKinnon famously said it typically takes three women
claiming sexual harassment by the same person to be believed. MacKinnon, supra
note 40. Perhaps it takes even more when the women are women of color. See id.
Hawkins, 517 F.3d at 331.

212.
213.

Id.
Id.
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coworker retaliation of which it knew or should have known. 2 14
Although the court insisted that this was not a "mere negligence"
standard, it analogized employer fault for coworker retaliation to the
standard of liability for coworker sexual harassment. 2 15
The
obligation to avoid manifest indifference and unreasonableness
requires an employer response that is reasonably calculated to end the
retaliation.2 1 6 In the case at hand, the company's failure to
investigate the plaintiff s charge, that the coworker had set fire to her
car after she reported him for sexual harassment, satisfied the
standard and gave rise to actionable retaliation.2 17
Other circuit courts too have looked to the liability standard for
coworker harassment to formulate the rule for employer liability in
coworker retaliation cases. 2 18 An early adopter, the Second Circuit
first announced this rule in a case involving coworker retaliation for
racial harassment, Richardson v. New York State Department of
Corrections.2 19 The coworkers' retaliatory acts in that case included
putting hair in the complainant's food, placing manure in her parking
space, shooting rubber bands at her, and vandalizing her car. 220 The
employer responded flippantly to the plaintiff when it learned of
these actions, suggesting that she try mediation and telling her that
attitudes are hard to change. 22 1 The court denied the employer's
motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim, holding that
unchecked retaliatory coworker harassment, if severe enough, is
actionable under the same standard of employer liability that governs
coworker harassment.2 22
The Third Circuit also regards coworker harassment as the model
for employer liability for coworker retaliation.2 2 3 In an influential
case recognizing coworker retaliation claims under Title VII, Jensen
v. Potter, the court reversed the district court's decision that

214.

215.

Id. at 338 (quoting Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir.
1997)). The Sixth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for two of the
plaintiffs' sexual harassment claims. Id at 327.
Id. at 338.

216.

See id. at 342-43.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 349. However, the employer's prompt investigation of the house fire warranted
summary judgment for the employer on that plaintiff's retaliation claim. Id.
See infra notes 219-28 and accompanying text.
Richardsonv. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr., 180 F.3d 426, 441 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 446.

223.

See Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 448-51 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other

grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
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coworker retaliation did not violate Title VII. 2 24 While noting a split
in the circuits on the issue, the court sided with the majority that have
recognized a claim for retaliatory harassment. 225 The court saw no
reason for applying a higher standard of employer liability to
coworker retaliatory harassment than courts apply to coworker sexual
harassment, which it understood to be grounded in a theory of
employer negligence.2 2 6 Numerous courts have followed suit and,
after considering the uncertain state of the law, 227 have settled upon
the "knew or should have known" negligence standard for coworker
retaliation.228
The negligence-only courts have a better understanding of the
relationship between retaliation and discrimination and the
implications for employer liability.
Courts applying a higher
standard of liability to coworker retaliation than to coworker
harassment ignore the slipperiness of the line separating retaliatory
harassment from sexual (and other forms of discriminatory)
harassment. 229 A recent district court case, Parrav. City of White
Plains, illustrates how sexual harassment and retaliation by
coworkers can intertwine to give rise to the challenged conduct.2 30 in
that case, a Hispanic female police officer claimed that she was
sexually harassed by two fellow officers. 23 1 Her complaints were
followed by a substantial amount of negative harassment by other
officers, including gender-specific name-calling and threats.232 The
facts portray a hostile reaction to her sexual harassment complaint
that was inextricably tied to her being a woman who complained
about sexual harassment by men on the force.2 33 Where retaliatory
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id at 454.
Id at 448.
Id. at 452-53.
See cases cited infra note 228.
See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 95 (1st Cir. 2005); see Madeja v. MPB
Corp., 821 A.2d 1034, 1044-45 (N.H. 2003) (expressing disagreement with Gunnell
v. Utah Valley State College and finding no justification for imposing a higher
standard for coworker retaliation than for coworker harassment).

229.

See infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.

230.
231.
232.

See Parrav. City of White Plains, 48 F. Supp. 3d 542, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 547.
Id. at 549. Gender-specific insults frequently appear in retaliatory harassment against
women who report sexual harassment. See, e.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1335
(7th Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiff's coworkers called plaintiff a "fucking bitch" for
reporting sexual harassment). See generally Flockhart v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.,
192 F. Supp. 2d 947, 967 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (concluding that the terms "'slut,'
'whore,' 'bitch,' and a 'cunt.' are gender-based insults).
See Parra,48 F. Supp. 3d at 547-49.
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and discriminatory reasons intertwine to motivate a coworker's
hostile treatment of the plaintiff, the same underlying conduct can
form the basis for both a retaliation claim and a harassment claim.2 3 4
Neither the court nor the employer will likely be able to accurately
parse and apportion the retaliatory and discriminatory underpinnings
of a particular hostile act. 23 5 The impossibility of the task warrants
imposing the same obligation on employers to respond to coworker
retaliation as they are required to do in responding to sexual
harassment by coworkers.2 36
Even when negligence is the standard used for determining
employer liability for coworker retaliation, uncertainty remains about
how the standard applies to retaliation claims specifically.2 37 One
issue courts are likely to face in coworker retaliation claims based on
a negligence theory, is how to evaluate whether the employer had
notice of the retaliation.2 38 What constitutes notice of coworker
retaliation, and who must receive it? 239 Even for coworker sexual
harassment, imputing notice to the employer can be tricky.2 4 0 Some
courts require notice to come through the employer's official antiharassment policy. 24 1 Others require notice to be directed to a person
who meets the definition of a supervisor under Vance, rather than to
persons who are mere coworkers.2 4 2 But modeling how notice is
handled for coworker sexual harassment may not chart the best path
234.

235.
236.
237.
238.

See Rhonda Reaves, Retaliatory Harassment: Sex and the Hostile Coworker as the
Enforcer of Workplace Norms, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 403, 429 (discussing how
conduct can be a form of both retaliation and harassment).
See id. at 405-07, 429-31.
See id. at 405-07.
See infra text accompanying notes 238-46.
See Thomas J. Hook, Jr., Defining Employer Liability in Sexual Harassmentand Title
VI Retaliation Claims: The Supreme Court Creates the Same Problem Twice, 13
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADvOc. 121, 135 (2008).

239.

240.

241.

242.

Cf Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 96-97 (1st Cir. 2005) (concluding that
there was evidence of actual notice where plaintiff complained to persons defined as
"senior" and "high-level" supervisors and the deputy commissioner).
See Ronald Turner, Title VII and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment:
Aislabeling the Standardof Employer Liability, 71 UNIV. DET. MERCY L. REV. 8 17,
827-828 (1994).
Id. In coworker harassment cases, the failure to report harassment through official
channels has blocked employer liability based on the employer's knowledge and
failure to respond. See, e.g., Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 Fed. Appx. 442 (5th
Cir. 2014) (holding that employer did not have notice of coworker racial harassment
where plaintiff, an apprentice, complained about the harassment to his union steward,
who was not an employee, even though the union steward brought the complaint to a
superintendent, who responded merely by saying the plaintiff should put it in writing).
See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 96-97.
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for coworker retaliation claims. 243 If the channels used to report
coworker sexual harassment resulted in retaliation, the plaintiff may
reasonably choose not to go down that same path again; choosing
instead to report the retaliation to persons outside of official
channels, who nonetheless have responsibility under employer
policies to report up the chain of command. 24 4 Relatedly, an
important question in the #MeToo era is whether social media
disclosures, when read by agents of the employer, might provide
notice to the employer, either of the underlying harassment or of any
subsequent retaliation.2 45 Imposing tight limits on the channels and
persons that effectively impute notice of retaliatory actions may
hamper the ability of Title VII to offer meaningful protection from
coworker retaliation.24 6
Rather than track the same strictures that limit employer notice of
coworker retaliation, retaliation law should take a more expansive
approach to notice, precisely because of the well-known likelihood
that complaints about sexual harassment will provoke retaliatory
reactions by others, including coworkers, in the workplace.2 47
Constructive notice should play a greater role in coworker retaliation
cases by putting the onus on the employer, once aware that plaintiff
has complained about sexual harassment, to be watchful for signs of
retaliation.2 4 8 Incentivizing a more proactive employer stance might
deter some retaliatory responses from occurring.2 4 9
An even greater area of uncertainty about how a negligence
standard applies to coworker retaliation is in calibrating the

243.

See Reaves, supra note 234, at 428-29.

244.

See Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 403 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[R]epresentatives
admitted that the proper procedure for an employee to report a claim of harassment
was to notify his or her team leader. Once a team leader received a complaint from an
employee, it was the team leader's duty to report the complaint up the chain of
command to his or her supervisor. Therefore, by maintaining a policy that permitted
workers to report sexual harassment claims to team leaders, L.L. Bean provided these
team leaders with actual authority to receive notice of sexual harassment complaints
on behalf of the company, and their knowledge was imputed to it.").

245.

See Kristen N. Coletta, Sexual Harassment on Social Media: Tihy Traditional
Company Sexual HarassmentPolicies Are Not Enough and How to Fix It, 48 SETON

HALL L. REv. 449, 460-463, 470-471 (2018).
246.
247.
248.
249.

See
See
See
See

Reaves, supra note 234, at 432.
id. at 433.
EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 35.
id. at 25, 33, 56.
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reasonableness of the employer's response. 25 0 This is, at-best, a gray
area even for coworker sexual harassment, and coworker retaliation
claims likely pose additional challenges.2 5 1 What constitutes a
reasonable response to actionable conduct in the workplace has long
been contested.2 5 2 in coworker sexual harassment cases, courts
require the employer, once on notice of the harassment, to take
prompt and appropriate action "reasonably calculated" to end the
harassment.2 5 3
Factors relevant to the reasonableness of the
employer's response include: whether the employer conducted an
investigation, the promptness of any response, the reasonableness of
any remedial measures and, if ineffective, whether stronger measures
followed.2 5 4
Despite the open-endedness of this inquiry, some principles and
outer limits are discernible.2 5 5 Ignoring, not investigating, and failing
to follow up on known coworker retaliation is an unreasonable
employer response that may render the employer liable.2 56 Even
when the employer does respond, certain actions may be too little,
too late to be reasonable.2 5 7 Waiting an unreasonable amount of time
to act may render the employer liable, as occurred in Jensen, where
management personnel waited nineteen months before meeting with

250.

251.

See generally Polanco v. UPS Freight Serys. Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 470, 496-97
(D.P.R. 2016) (finding a variety of factors that could result in reasonably calculated
action by the employer to prevent a claim of negligence).
See id. at 496-99.

252.

See infra notes 253-71 and accompanying text.

253.
254.

Polanco, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 496.
Id. at 497 (denying employer's motion for summary judgment on coworker sexual
harassment claim where the employer gave warnings and took mild measures, but the
harassment continued without appropriate follow-through by the employer).
See infra notes 256-271 and accompanying text.
See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 81, 95-97 (1st Cir. 2005) (not taking
action and speculating that harassment will likely become ten times worse after the
plaintiffs shift change survived summary judgement on the knew or should have
known and failed to take reasonable corrective action standard of liability); see Patton
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 234 F.3d 1269, 4-6 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding retaliation
verdict where employer failed to follow up on or condemn coworker's retaliatory
harassment); see Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't Corr. Sers., 180 F.3d 426, 447 (2d
Cir. 1999) (replying to complaint of coworker retaliation by suggesting that the
plaintiff try mediation and reminding her that it might be "hard to change attitudes"
was unreasonable).
Cf Kelley v. Conco Cos., 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651, 659-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(considering the employer's action of moving the employee to a different job site and
blaming the work culture created enough of a genuine issue of material fact to deny
Defendant's motion for summary judgment).

255.
256.

257.
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the offending coworker-an intervention that occurred only at the
initiative of a new (female) supervisor.2 5 8
2 5 9 the court upheld a jury verdict
In a closer case, Knox v. Indiana,
in a coworker retaliation case based on a shorter, one-month delay by
the employer in responding.26 0 In that case, after the plaintiff
reported a supervisor's sexual harassment, she was met with threats
by coworkers to make her life "hell," to "get her," and a campaign of
"insulting and demeaning statements" and "vicious gossip. "261 When
told about the campaign of coworker harassment, the employer's
affirmative action officer did "nothing at the time," telling the
plaintiff that she could not take any action without the plaintiff
providing names of the persons retaliating.2 62 Because much of the
harassment was behind the plaintiffs back, that was a tall order.2 63
About a month after this exchange, the plaintiff was able to find out
the names of several of the retaliatory harassers and provided them to
the affirmative action officer, who subsequently investigated,
counseled the offending employees, and recommended disciplinary
action against one of them.2 64 Regarding it as a close case, the court
upheld the jury verdict for the plaintiff, finding that the jury could
have reasonably concluded that the affirmative action officer's initial
response amounted to a "brush-off' followed by an unwarranted
delay given the extent and severity of the retaliatory harassment.2 6 5
While these principles impose some affirmative obligations on
employers to respond to coworker retaliation,2 66 there are limits to
what the law requires.2 6 7 Importantly, courts do not require the
employer to actually stop the coworker's retaliation, as long as the
employer's response was "reasonably calculated" to end the
retaliation. 268 Nor do courts find it unreasonable as a matter of law to
take no remedial action if the employer investigated but found
insufficient evidence of wrongdoing. 269 As the Third Circuit clarified
258.
259.
261.

Jensenv. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 447, 452-53 (3d Cir. 2006).
Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1335-36.
Id. at 1331, 1335.

262.
263.

Id. at 1330-31.
See id. at 1335.

264.

Id at 1331.
Id. at 1335-36.
See supra text accompanying notes 255-65.
See infra text accompanying notes 268-71.
Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114
F.3d 407, 412-13 (3d Cir. 1997)).
See Knabe, 114 F.3d at 412-13.

260.

265.

266.
267.
268.

269.
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in Jensen, Title VII is satisfied if the employer promptly investigates
allegations of coworker retaliation but finds insufficient evidence to
take disciplinary action.2 70 Conversely, if the coworker retaliation
does in fact stop after the employer's response, courts have found the
employer's response to be per se reasonable, even if it could be
faulted as insufficient on its face.27 1
While these principles offer some guidance, they still leave
substantial gray area as to what is required for a reasonable employer
response to coworker retaliation.2 7 2 One risk to plaintiffs is that
courts may believe it is reasonable to give employers more latitude in
responding to coworker retaliation than in responding to coworker
sexual harassment. 2 73 Although not tethered to the legal framework
governing employer liability, courts have expressed sympathy for the
emotional bonds that could lead coworkers to side with friends and
colleagues accused of harassment 2 74 and have cautioned that
retaliation law should not interfere with the expression of support for
coworkers who have been accused of sexual harassment. 2 75 For
example, the court in Noviello v. City of Boston observed a "unique"
difficulty in adjudicating retaliatory harassment claims, as compared
to sexual harassment claims, in that there is a plausibly defensible
purpose motivating employees to side with an accused friend or
avoid the complainant in order to stay out of the fray.2 76 Judicial
sympathy for coworkers whose inclination is to side with the accused
may cause courts to be more sympathetic to employers who decline
to intervene in coworker retaliation and more likely to pronounce an
employer's minimal efforts as reasonable.2 7 7 The perception that
coworker retaliation is more excusable than coworker sexual
270.

See Jensen, 435 F.3d at 453.

271.

Id. (citing Knabe, 114 F.3d at 411-12 & n.8) ("An effective remedy-one that stops
the harassment-is adequate per se."); see also Ryan v. Shulkin, No. 1: 15-CV-02384,
2017 WL 6270209, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2017) (holding that the plaintiff cannot
show the employer's response to be unreasonable if the retaliatory harassment
stopped soon after she reported it).

272.

See supra notes 250-54 and accompanying text.

273.
274.

See infra notes 276-78 and accompanying text.
See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 93 (1st Cir. 2005).

275.

See id.

276.
277.

Id. at 92-93.
See id. at 93 ("We think . . . that those actions that are hurtful to a complainant only
because coworkers do not take [their] side in a work-related dispute may not be
considered as contributing to a retaliatory hostile work environment."); see also Ryan
v. Shulkin, No. 1:15-CV-02384, 2017 WL 6270209, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2017)
(finding that simply conducting a mandatory in-service training to address an
employee's complaints of sexual harassment was a reasonable response by the
employer because the offensive conduct stopped).
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harassment may create an unstated higher threshold for retaliation
plaintiffs to prove unreasonableness in the employer's responsive
action. 271
This same understanding of the possible legitimacy behind a
coworker's inclination to "circle the wagons" and side with the
accused may lead both courts and employers to believe there is little
they can do to effectively prevent and correct the coworker dynamics
that lead to retaliation.2 79 Courts may view such dynamics as
ungovernable, falling in the realm of the social rather than the formal,
professional environment, such that they are sympathetic to
employers who effectively throw up their hands when faced with the
difficult task of preventing or halting coworker retaliation, placing
only weak obligations on employers to take corrective action. 28 0 To
be sure, this can be a problem in coworker sexual harassment claims
too, but the inclination to view sexual harassers as aberrational bad
actors may make it easier for courts to conclude that the employer
could have, and should have, done something to weed out the sexual
harasser.2 8 1
It is not at all clear, however, that courts' perceptions of the
intractability of mounting an effective employer response to
coworker retaliation corresponds to reality.2 82 In Jensen, where the
278.

279.
280.

281.

282.

See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 92-93. Judicially enforced obligations on employers to
remedy coworker retaliation can be especially complex in academic settings, where
academic freedom is involved. See, e.g., Shott v. Katz, 829 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2016)
(holding § 1981's ban on retaliation for opposing race discrimination was not violated
by fellow university professor's refusal to collaborate with the plaintiff on research
for retaliatory reasons, citing first amendment concerns that a contrary ruling would
raise).
See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 93 ("The very act of filing a charge against a coworker will
cause tension and result in a less agreeable workplace."); see also Brooks v. City of
San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Because an employer cannot force
employees to socialize with one another, ostracism suffered at the hands of coworkers
cannot constitute an adverse employment action."); cf Greer v. City of Escodido,
Nos. D038093, D038644, 2002 WL 31555286, at *1l (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002)
(" [T]he alleged lack of civility of coworkers does not constitute adverse employment
action upon which a retaliation claim can be based. Absent facts that an employer
instructed coworkers to avoid or shun the plaintiff in retaliation for asserting a
harassment complaint, there is no actionable retaliation.").
See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 92-93 (stating that there is seldom, if ever, a defensible
purpose behind discriminatory harassment as opposed to retaliatory harassment which
requires a more nuanced analysis for determining whether the purpose was proper).
See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 629-31 (arguing that coworker reactions to
harassment and to the reporting of harassment are largely determined by the
employer's actions and managerial responses).
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plaintiff experienced persistent and escalating coworker retaliation
for over a year, once the employer finally held a formal meeting with
the retaliating coworker, the retaliation stopped immediately. 283 But
the perception, if not the reality, of greater difficulty managing and
deterring coworker retaliation than harassment by coworkers may
nudge courts to accept lower-level responses as reasonable in
retaliation cases.2 84
With all of this uncertainty, employer liability for coworker
retaliation stands out as an under-developed area of retaliation law at
a time when courts have otherwise been highly attentive to the
development of the law governing retaliation claims. 285 The legal
framework treats coworker retaliation as a less-favored stepchild in
relation to other discrimination and retaliation claims. 28 6 The secondtier status of employer liability for coworker retaliation claims maps
onto the well-worn public/private dichotomy by treating informal
relationships and interactions between colleagues at work as more
private than public, and farther from the law's legitimate reach.2 8 7
Doing so understates the harm and silencing power of coworker
interactions, and their centrality to the workplace. 28 8 The social
dimensions of workplace relationships overlap with the professional
dimensions, making coworker relationships integrally connected to
job performance and job satisfaction.28 9
Indeed, changes in
workplace structures that flatten lines of authority and push
collaborative work cultures have made coworker relationships all the
more powerful in shaping professional opportunities.2 9 0
These loose chickens may come home to roost in the #MeToo era.
Judicial reluctance to police exercises of informal power in the
workplace and to intrude into the "social" realm of workplace

283.

Jensenv. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2006).

284.

See supra notes 272-81 and accompanying text.

285.

See discussion supra Section II.A.

286.
287.

See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
See Laura A. Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 117,
120-22 (2011).

288.

See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 613, 629 (discussing the impact of coworker
relationships on productivity and moral).
See Rosenbury, supra note 287, at 129-34 (discussing findings of social science
research on the role of coworkers in succeeding at work); see also CYNTHIA ESTLUND,

289.

WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY

290.

20, 27 (2003); see also Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1948,
1959 (2000).
See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 613 (discussing the centrality of coworker
relationships to work productivity and employee job performance).
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dynamics does not bode well for protecting women who complain of
sexual harassment from a #MeToo backlash.2 9 1
B.

When Does Coworker RetaliationDeter a Reasonable Employee

from Complaining?
Not all negative reactions to employees for opposing
discrimination are unlawful.2 92 Retaliation must rise to a certain
level of severity to violate Title VII. 29 3
The Supreme Court
formulated the governing standard in Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Railway v. White, requiring the retaliation to rise to a level of
severity such that "it well might have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.' 29 4 11In
keeping with the Court's emphasis on the purpose of the retaliation
claim, the Court explained that the standard should take into account
how the alleged retaliation would likely affect an employee in the
circumstances of the plaintiff. 295 Although the Court described this
as an objective standard, it instructed lower courts to apply it to the
situated employee by considering the relevant circumstances that
might impact the employee's likelihood of complaining.2 9 6 For
example, the Court noted that a shift change might be trivial to many
workers but chilling to a single mother for whom predictability in
work schedules was necessary to coordinate her children's school
and day care schedules. 297 The Court had little trouble determining
that the retaliatory actions in Burlington Northern, assigning the
plaintiff more difficult job responsibilities and placing her on an
unpaid leave (for which she subsequently received backpay), met the
standard. 29 8 The Court distinguished such actionable retaliation from
what it called "normal" workplace slights of snubbing and shunning,
which fall outside the reach of Title VII's protection from
retaliation.2 9 9
The retaliation in Burlington Northern was undertaken by
supervisors who had the authority to change the plaintiffs job

291.

See supra note 280 and accompanying text.

292.
293.
294.

See Hernandez v. Yellow Transp. Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012).
See Jensenv. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449-50 (3d Cir. 2006).
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quoting Rochon
v. Gonzales 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
See id. at 69.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 69.
See id. at 70-73.
Id. at 68.

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
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responsibilities and work status.3 00 Post-Burlington Northern case
law, lower courts suggest that retaliatory actions by coworkers are
less likely to meet the standard.3 0 1 Courts applying the Burlington
Northern framework tend to dismiss retaliatory harassment by
coworkers as "pranks," placing coworker harassment on the same
footing as the "snubbing" that the Court indicated was part and parcel
of a "normal" workplace.3 0 2 Sometimes courts even place coworker
sabotage and vandalism in this category, despite its progression well
past the point of social ostracism or snubbing.30 3 in one such case,
the retaliation included loading up the complaining employee's trailer
with garbage dozens of times over four years, requiring the
complainant to repeatedly clear off the trailer in order to ready it for
use on the job.3 04 The court dismissed the incidents as "pranks" and
held that it did not meet the Burlington Northern threshold for
actionable retaliation.30 5
As commentators have noted, lower courts tend to assume that
complainants are resilient enough to hold their own and will tolerate
a good bit of pushback from colleagues without it weakening their

300. Id at 57-59.
301. See Fercello v. County of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1081 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that
coworkers' actions making plaintiff feel unwelcome at meetings, rolling their eyes at
her, interrupting her, and ignoring her contributions were not sufficiently severe to
support her retaliation claim); see also Nordike v. Verizon Bus., Inc., No. 12-2686JAR, 2014 WL 4749185 at *10 (D. Kan. Sept. 24, 2014) (finding that a statement by
"difficult employee" on a conference call that he would never work with plaintiff
again was not materially adverse); see also Perkins v. Harvey, 368 F. App'x 640, 648
(6th Cir. 2010) (finding that a coworker's statement that he did not believe in filing
lawsuits or EEO complaints was not materially adverse); see also Verrinder v. Rite
Aid Corp., No. 3:06cv00024, 2007 WL 4357595, at *19 (W.D. Va. Dec. 11, 2007)
(finding that a coworker's warning, "[d]o you know what happens in a lawsuit? The
lawyers will know everything about your life and it will come out in court. It won't
be pretty," would not be materially adverse to a reasonable employee, although
acknowledging that "a naive employee might find [the coworker's] statement to be
materially adverse"). But see Burrell v. Shephard, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13-14 (D.D.C.
2018) (denying summary judgment for employer on plaintiff's retaliation claim where
plaintiff alleged "that her coworkers refused to speak to her, 'making it very difficult
for her to perform her assigned tasks,"' and "made derogatory comments about [her]
on social media," and sent an email questioning her motives for reporting the alleged
discrimination, in addition to other retaliatory acts).
302. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68; see Carpenter v. Con-Way Cent. Express, Inc., 481
F.3d 611, 615 (8th Cir. 2007).
303.

See Carpenter, 481 F.3d at 618-19.

304. Id The plaintiff was also the target of a series of hostile and racist remarks, which he
learned about from other coworkers. Id at 614.
305. Id. at 618-19.
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resolve to complain.3 0 6 Professor Sandra Sperino has critiqued the
case law for determining that certain actions do not meet the
Burlington Northern standard as a matter of law because it ignores
the Court's directive to apply the objective reasonable person
standard to the situated plaintiff and does not take into account all
relevant circumstances. 3 0 7 By not examining the circumstances that
make a plaintiff vulnerable to coworker retaliation, this approach
understates the harm of retaliation in particular cases in ways that are
likely to chill #MeToo stories of workplace harassment.3 0 8
The cases also minimize the deterrent force of retaliatory threats
and other verbally abusive behavior. 309
Threats of retaliation
generally do not meet the Burlington Northern standard, even when
made by supervisors. 3 10 Harassing, shunning, and ostracizing also
fall on the lawful side of the line.31 1 When the shunning and verbal
offense
comes
from
coworkers,
courts
are particularly
circumspect.3 1 2 Verbal retaliation by coworkers typically falls short
of what courts view as likely to chill a reasonable person from
complaining.3 1 3

The line that courts seem most comfortable enforcing separates
run-of-the-mill retaliatory comments from specific threats of violence
and physical harm.3 14 In Noviello v. City of Boston, for example, the
306.

See CHARLES A.

SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 428 (9th ed. 2017) (describing the post-Burlington

Northern lower court decisions as assuming that employees are made of "stem stuff').
307.

See Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031,

2052-55 (2015).
308. See id. at 2079-80.
309. See infra notes 310-13 and accompanying text.
310.
311.

See SULLIVAN & ZIMMER, supra note 306, at 429.
See Porter,supra note 2, at 54.

312. See cases cited infra note 313.
313. See Juarez v. Utah, 263 F. App'x 726, 733, 737 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding coworkers'
negative reactions to Latina dental assistant who filed a sexual harassment complaint
against the dentist, including comment that the complainant is "good only to do dishes
at the office," would not have dissuaded a reasonable worker from complaining); see
Reeves v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:12-CV-00018, 2013 WL 2177918, at
*10 (M.D. Tenn. May 20, 2013) (finding that intimidating, unprofessional behavior,
and rudeness would not dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining); see Clay
v. Lafarge N. Am., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1030 (S.D. Iowa 2013) (finding that
shunning and ostracism at work did not satisfy the BurlingtonNorthern standard); cf
Ramsdell v. Huhtamaki, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D. Maine 2014) (finding that mere
rudeness, social ostracism, and staring were not severe enough to be qualifying
"anchoring events" within the limitations period to make the subsequent untimely
retaliation actionable).
314. See infra notes 315-19 and accompanying text.
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court acknowledged that rudeness, social ostracism, siding with the
accused, and avoiding the complainant would all fail to satisfy the
Burlington Northern standard, but distinguished the facts in Noviello,
holding that they did meet the standard.3 1 5 The coworker retaliation
in Noviello included physically threatening conduct, a false
accusation of misconduct, and actions calculated to interfere with the
plaintiffs work performance; the court found these to be ubiquitous,
severe, and having a "natural tendency to humiliate" a reasonable
person.31 Similarly, the court in Jensen v. Potter emphasized that
the nineteen months of retaliatory harassment by two coworkers went
far beyond "the silent treatment" and siding with the accused over the
complainant; rather, their actions crossed over to violent threats and
vandalism.3 17 The retaliatory conduct included sneaking up behind
the complainant and then frightening her with a loud clap, running
toward her with a mail cart in threatening way as if to run her over,
and vandalizing her car in the employee parking lot.31 8 As another
court explained, getting the cold shoulder from coworkers does not
cross the line, but one coworker repeatedly calling the plaintiff and
threatening physical violence would dissuade a reasonable worker
from complaining.3 1 9
Although courts issue such pronouncements regularly and with
great confidence, the empirical justification offered for them is thin
or nonexistent.3 2 0 Indeed, the empirical research regarding what
actions are likely to deter people from complaining about
discrimination cuts in the opposite direction.32 1 In fact, shunning the
complainant and siding with the accused appears highly likely to
dissuade many, if not most, persons from complaining.32 2 Professor

315.
316.
317.
318.

See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 93-94 (1st Cir. 2005).
Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
Jensenv. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 447. Jensen was decided before Burlington Northern, but its rationale survives
that decision even though its precise holding, which assumed that retaliation is
governed by the same standard of material adversity that governs discrimination
claims under § 703 of Title VII, does not. Compare id. at 448-49, with Burlington N.
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60-61 (2006). In finding the pattern of
retaliatory harassment in Jensen to be sufficiently severe to be materially adverse
under § 703, the court's reasoning necessarily means that the conduct would also meet
the Burlington Northern standard of likely to chill a reasonable employee from
complaining. See BurlingtonN., 548 U.S. at 68.
319. Ryanv. Shulkin, No. 1:15-CV-02384, 2017 WL 6270209, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8,
2017).
320.
321.
322.

See infra notes 322-27 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 322-27 and accompanying text.
Sperino, supra note 307, at 2043, 2045.
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Sperino's study of law students asking whether certain actions would
dissuade them from reporting discrimination elicited affirmative
responses to numerous kinds of actions courts have found unlikely to
chill discrimination complaints.3 23
When asked whether social
ostracism by coworkers might dissuade them from complaining, 50%
of the law students surveyed responded affirmatively.3 2 4
Social science research on the workplace also calls into question
courts' reluctance to find retaliatory acts by coworkers, as opposed to
supervisors, to satisfy the Burlington Northern test.3 2 5 Research on
workplace dynamics has found that the harms to employees from
misconduct and ostracism by others at work is actually greater when
coming from coworkers than from higher-ups. 32 6
Coworker
shunning, social exclusion, and incivility push targeted employees to
leave their employers at a greater rate than similar conduct by
supervisors.3 2 7
Regardless of the organizational position of the retaliator, the
literature reveals a gap between what actually deters employees from
raising complaints about discrimination and what people, including
judges, believe will stop people from complaining.3 2 8 People are
more easily deterred from speaking out than is commonly realized.3 2 9
The case law applying the Burlington Northern standard in the lower
courts exposes that gap in stark relief, as courts hew to the line that
ostracism, threats, and a great deal of other negative behaviors would
not deter a reasonable person from complaining.3 30
What explains the gap between judges' predictions of what is
reasonably chilling and real world experience? 331 Law Professor
Nicole Buonocore Porter speculates that federal judges, with their
lifetime job security, have a particularly distorted understanding of

323.

Id at 2043.

324. Id. at 2045. Interestingly, 80% of the respondents said that a negative evaluation
would likely deter them from complaining, even though courts often find such actions
insufficiently severe to satisfy the BurlingtonNorthern standard. Id.
325.

See Sandra L. Robinson et al., Coworkers Behaving Badly: The Impact of Coworker
Deviant Behavior upon Individual Employees, 1 ANN. REV. ORG. PSYCHOL. & ORG.

BEHAV. 123, 129 (2014) (summarizing literature and finding harms from coworker
aggression and ostracism are greater than from persons higher in the organizational
hierarchy).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 127.
328.
329.
330.
331.

See
See
See
See

Sperino, supra note 307, at 2033.
id.
id at 2041.
infra notes 332-47 and accompanying text.
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how job insecurity affects reasonable people in their calculations
about whether to report discrimination.332 Her explanation has great
intuitive appeal, but there seems to be an additional element of
resistance when it comes to predicting reactions to coworker
retaliation.3 3 3
A distinctive consideration driving the coworker
retaliation decisions is judicial anxiety about how deeply courts
would have to involve themselves in overseeing employer intrusions
into the coworker dynamics of a workplace if snubbing and social
ostracism met the standard.3 3 4 If more coworker negative reactions,
short of violence, triggered an employer duty to respond, a
reasonable response may need to be more nuanced than simply firing
the hostile employee.3 3 5 Judicial supervision of employer responses
to more subtle coworker interactions may trigger ham-fisted reactions
that overreach into employee relationships, and instead of changing
norms to support #MeToo callouts, result in greater backlash and
#MeToo fatigue.33 6
This is a legitimate concern with no easy answers.3 3 7 A few courts
recognizing coworker retaliation claims have grappled with it
forthrightly.3 3 8 In Jensen, the court expressed concern that, despite
recognizing coworker retaliation as potentially actionable, the law
should not interfere with the reality that strains on relationships are
inevitable, stating "[s]ides will be chosen, lines will be drawn," and
former friends may become not so friendly.3 39 The court took pains
to explain that "what the statute proscribes is retaliation, not loyalty
to an accused coworker or a desire to avoid entanglement."3 40 The
court appears to be more concerned that the law leaves ample room
for employers to allow "[m]ere expressions of opinion" than the
chilling effect on complaining employees.3 4 1 in Jensen, the court
found statements from coworkers that the harasser should not have

332.
333.

Porter, supra note 2, at 55.
See infra notes 334-36 and accompanying text.

334. See generally Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 513 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Posner, C.J., concurring and dissenting) ("[W]hen it comes to designing the optimum
system for reining in the discretion of supervisory employees, the courts are at sea and
it makes sense therefore to shift the responsibility entirely to the employer to create
and administer an effective system for the review and control of company actions
taken by supervisors in the exercise of their delegated authority.").
335. See supra notes 252-57, 266-80 and accompanying text.
336. See infra notes 479-83 and accompanying text.
337. See infra notes 479-83 and accompanying text.
338.

See infra notes 339-44 and accompanying text.

339. Jensenv. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 2006).
340. Id.
341.

See id.

Coworker Retaliation

2019]

37

been fired, that he "shouldn't have to apologize for anything," and
that a petition to have the harasser rehired all failed the Burlington
Northern standard.3 4 2 Title VII is "not 'a general civility code,"' the
court reiterated.34 3 The court in Noviello engaged in a similar
analysis, adding that, unlike status-based harassment, there may well
be a defensible purpose underlying retaliatory harassment, because
there is "nothing inherently wrong" with supporting an accused
friend or wanting to stay out of the fray by avoiding the
complainant.34
My reading of the cases is that judicial resistance to taking Title
VII more deeply into the realm of coworker interactions has more to
do with concerns about judicially enforced employer responses to
employee expressions of support than the actual inhibitive effects on
complaining employees, which may be quite devastating. 345 The
reality is that siding with the accused over the complaining employee
and the risk of widespread shunning may well chill reasonable
employees from complaining about sexual harassment,3 4 6 but the
courts are loathe to force or incentivize employer surveillance of the
social and relational aspects of work.3 47
At one level, this is problematic for complainants and does not
bode well for the continued traction of #MeToo, at least when it
comes to calling out sexual harassment at work while remaining
employed in the workplace where the harassment occurred. 3 48 The
"social" aspects of the job may not be severable from job
performance and professional advancement, especially in workplace
cultures where collaboration is key. 3 49
Being ostracized by

342. Id.; see Burlington N. & Santa Fey Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
343. Jensen, 435 F.3d at 449 (quoting Oncale v. Sundance Offshore Serys., 523 U.S. 75,
80 (1998)).
344. Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 93 (1st Cir. 2005).
345. See BurlingtonN., 548 U.S. at 68.
346. See generally Porter, supra note 2, at 51, 55, 59 (explaining that many employees do
not report sexual harassment because they fear social ostracism or that no one will
believe them).
347. See generally Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 511 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Posner, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that forcing an employer to
continuously monitor employees would be too expensive and invasive to their
privacy).

348. See generally Ferguson v. Associated Grocers, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967-68 (D.
Kan. 2007) (the employee who reported harassment received threatening phone calls
and had her tires slashed when she returned to work following administrative leave).
349. See sources cited supra note 289.
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coworkers on a rampage to support the accused might be enough to
chill all but the most stalwart of complainants.3 5 0
And yet, there are reasons to pause before pressing too far in the
direction of capturing all negative coworker reactions as
retaliation.3 5 1
If all reasonably chilling coworker interactions
triggered the employer's duty to take corrective action, Title VII
might require employers to intrude deeply into coworker
relationships and expression of authentic sentiments.3 5 2 Even setting
aside the potential First Amendment implications of requiring
employers to monitor employee expressions of support for either side
in a contested allegation (which is beyond the scope of this essay), it
is not clear that the most stringent legal approach would have the
most positive impact in opening up the channels of dissent to sexual
harassment.3 5 3 Shifting workplace norms against sexually harassing
behaviors at work may require adequate space for airing differences
of opinion about what happened and who is right, even if some of
these expressions will inevitably be chilling.3 5 4
Even while acknowledging this difficulty, it is possible to
recognize the need for employers to allow room for expressing
differences of opinion while still criticizing the lines that courts have
drawn.3 55 It should not require coworker violence or threats of
violence to cross the line from legitimate social interactions to
actionable retaliation.3 5 6 Courts should be more attentive to how
coworkers impact an employee's ability to work and opportunities
for advancement.3 5 7 It should not be too much to require expressions
350.

See Porter,supra note 2, at 55.

351. See BurlingtonN. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
352. See Jansen, 123 F.3d at 511 (Posner, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that the
constant surveillance of employees would invade their privacy and would be too
costly).
353.

See Olivia B. Waxman, The Surprising Consequences of the Supreme Court Cases
that Changed Sexual Harassment Law 20 Years Ago, TIME (June 26, 2018),

https://time.com/53 19966/sexual-harassment-scotus-anniversary/
[http://perma.cc/X9AU-2BY2].
354.

See Valerie Bolden-Barrett, Study: Men and Women Disagree Over Impact and
Tracking ofHarassment, HR DIvE (July 27, 2018), https://www.hrdive.com/news/

study-men-and-women-disagree-over-impact-and-tracking-of-harassment/528676/
[http://perma.cc/YEK6-N2N3].
355. See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REv. 18, 73-74 (2005) (explaining
the importance of in-person discussions of social values at work).
356. See id. at 8 1-82.
357.

See generally Rosabeth M. Kanter, The Impact of HierarchicalStructures on the
Work Behavior of Women and Men, 23 Soc. PROBS. 415, 420 (1975) (data supports

the proposition that employee relationships impact work performance and one's
overall interest in the job).
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of support for the accused to be bound by professional norms and
basic civility, even if hard and fast rules for such boundaries are
elusive.358
It remains to be seen how the #MeToo movement will affect the
development of retaliation law as it responds to the murkiness of
coworker interactions.3 59 Will courts judge coworker retaliation
more or less likely to dissuade a reasonable employee from reporting
harassment amidst the aftershocks of #MeToo?3 60 I can imagine two
possible divergent paths.3 61
One possibility is that the outpouring of #MeToo stories,362 and the
increasing receptiveness of the public to listen to and believe them,3 63
will persuade courts that the norms have shifted to encourage the
telling of stories of sexual harassment, so that it should take more in
the way of negative reactions to chill complainants.3 64 Especially for
critics of the movement who are feeling under siege by an onslaught
of #MeToo stories,3 65 the takeaway from #MeToo might be that
women are now hellbent on telling their stories of harassment, and
that the norms have swung far in the other direction.3 66 This view
would support increased expectations for what coworkers would have
to do to chill the reasonable employee from complaining.3 67

358.

See generally Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace

Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1796 (1992) (discussing the difficulty in
limiting speech in the workplace with First Amendment and Harassment Law
protections).
359.

See MacKinnon, supra note 40.

360. See infra notes 362-75 and accompanying text.
361. See infra notes 362-75 and accompanying text.
362.

See Anna Codrea-Rado, #MeToo Floods Social Media with Stories of Harassment
andAssault, N.Y. TinES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/

technology/metoo-twitter-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/RL7F-T2EL].
363.

See Dalvin Brown, 19 Million Tweets Later: A Look at #MeToo a Year After the
Hashtag Went
Viral,
USA
TODAY
(Oct.
13,
2018,
10:12
PM),

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/10/13/metoo-impact-hashtag-madeonline/163 3 570002/ [https://perma.cc/JTM7-KL8A].
364.

See Alyssa Rosenberg, Why I Thought Twice Before Saying #MAleToo, WASH. POST

(Oct. 16, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/act-four/wp/2017/
10/16/metoo-of-course-but-what-comes-next/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/U7N6XBG4].
365.

See Katie Roiphe, The Other Whisper Network, HARPER'S MAG. (Mar. 2018),

https://harpers.org/archive/2018/03/the-other-whisper-network-2/
[https://perma.cc/VJE4-DNHK].
366. Id.
367.

See id.
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It would be unfortunate if the aftermath of #MeToo moved the law
to discourage workplace complaints of sexual harassment at a time
when more employers are inclined to do something about them.3 68
But that is not the only possible lesson from #MeToo that courts and
lawyers might draw.3 69 Another possibility is that the #MeToo
movement has shown how difficult it is to tell these stories in the
moment and to stand up to abuses of power from a vulnerable
position.370 The vast majority of high-profile #MeToo stories have
come out long after the fact, when the women who suffered abuses
are no longer in the vicinity of the abuser or his protectors.3 7 1 The
strength of the movement and the importance of the communal nature
of supportive responses demonstrates how difficult it is to tell these
stories without the support of coworkers.3 72 The very name of the
movement, MeToo, emphasizes the importance of validation by
others.3 73 This lesson might support easing the stringency of the
Burlington Northern standard,3 74 recognizing that coworker reactions
are no less important than the reactions of supervisors in either
narrowing or expanding the space to bring forward complaints of
harassment. 375
Because the standard for measuring the severity of actionable
retaliation is highly sensitive: to descriptive judgments about how
people respond to retaliation and to prescriptive judgments about
how resilient they should be in forging ahead with complaints;3 76 the
shifts in the cultural norms governing the reception of such stories
are likely to influence the development of the law in this area.3 7 7 It is
too soon to say what the #MeToo movement will portend, but a
368.

See Sindhu Sundar, How #MeToo Is Changing InternalInvestigations, LAw360 (Jan.

28, 2018, 9:17 PM), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2018/
01/how-metoo ischanginginternalinvestigations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZMW23D49].
369. See infra notes 370-75 and accompanying text.
370.

See Jacey Fortin, # ifylDidntReport: Survivors ofSexual Assault Share Their Stories
After Trump Tweet, N.Y. TImEs (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/

23/us/why-i-didnt-report-assault-stories.html [https://perma.cc/UCH4-3CJB].
371. Id.
372.

Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the AfeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L.

REV. 229, 252 & nn.148-50 (2018) (discussing the benefits of affirmative responses
from coworkers in sexual abuse disputes in the workplace).
373.
374.

See Wexler et al., supra note 1, at 71-72.
See supra notes 370-73 and accompanying text.

375. See Robinson et al., supranote 325, at 126-27.
376. See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 629-31 (arguing that coworker reactions to
harassment and to the reporting of harassment are largely determined by the
employer's actions and managerial responses).
377. Id.
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recent decision from the Third Circuit looks to lead the way.37 8 in
Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, the court opined that the #MeToo
movement has underscored the difficulty of speaking up in the face
of sexual harassment and abuse.3 79 The court's discussion focuses on
a different doctrine, the second prong of the affirmative defense to
supervisory sexual harassment, which asks whether the plaintiff
reasonably took advantage of the employer's preventive and
corrective measures for responding to sexual harassment.38 0 But the
court's analysis is equally pertinent to the question of whether a
reasonable employee would persevere and complain anyway, even
knowing that it would trigger the retaliatory acts at issue.3 8 1 The
court's acknowledgement of the difficulty, even under the best of
circumstances, to report sexual harassment goes toward a more
grounded application of the Burlington Northern standard to
coworker retaliation.38 2
C.

Causation:DisentanglingMixedMotives and But-For Causes in
the Wake ofNassar and #Me Too

In 2013, the Supreme Court sent shock waves through retaliation
law by deciding in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center
v. Nassar that plaintiffs bringing retaliation claims under Title VII
must prove that the retaliatory motive was the "but-for cause" of the
adverse action being challenged.3 83 Even though Title VII authorizes
employer liability for discrimination when the plaintiffs protected
class is a motivating factor for an adverse employment decision,3 84
the Court in Nassar restricted that proof framework to claims for
status-based discrimination under § 703 of the statute. 3 85 Henceforth,
the retaliation provision, § 704, which prohibits discrimination
"because of' the plaintiff's protected conduct, would be governed by
the stricter but-for standard of causation.3 8 6
378.
379.
380.
381.

See Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 310-11 (3d Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 311.

382.

See id. at 314.

383.
384.
385.
386.

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013).
See id. at 349.
See id. at 360.
See id. at 360-63.
The text, structure, and history of Title VII demonstrate that a
plaintiff making a retaliation claim under § 2000e-3(a) must
establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of
the alleged adverse action by the employer. The University claims
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That decision, which was criticized at the time for ignoring the
mixed motive model of causation dating back to 1989 in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,387 sets retaliation law on a collision course
with the real-world experience of discrimination and retaliation that
has been revealed in the #MeToo movement.3 8 8 The requirement of
but-for causation makes it harder to prove retaliation at a time when
norms are beginning to encourage coming forward with experiences
of sexual harassment, even while fatigue and backlash heighten the
risk of punishing responses to such stories.3 8 9 The causation proof
hurdle may increasingly challenge the ability of the law to adequately
protect sexual harassment complainants.3 90
Apart from raising the bar for the proof required to demonstrate
causation,391 the but-for standard rests on assumptions about
retaliatory motivations and their severability from discriminatory
motivations, which are on shaky premises.3 92 A threshold question in
approaching proof of causation, but one that is rarely, squarely
addressed by courts, is what kind of frame of mind qualifies as a
retaliatory motive.3 93 To win a retaliation claim even before Nassar,
courts required plaintiffs to prove that the challenged conduct was
motivated by retaliatory intent.3 9 4 Nassar did not create the need to

that a fair application of this standard, which is more demanding
than the motivating-factor standard adopted by the Court of
Appeals, entitles it to judgment as a matter of law.
Id. at 362-63.
387. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989).
388. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 6-14, 385 and accompanying text; see also Understanding the Me
Too Movement:

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

A

Sexual

Harassment Awareness Guide,

MARYVILLE

U.,

https://online.maryville.edu/blog/understanding-the-me-too-movement-a-sexualharassment-awareness-guide/ [https://perma.cc/SF2W-AZSY] (last visited Nov. 9,
2019).
See supra notes 383-86 and accompanying text; see also Nassar, 570 U.S. at 383-85
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362-63 (stating that the but-for causation standard is "more
demanding" than the motivating-factor standard).
See id. at 342.
See infra notes 398-408 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Perkins v. Harvey, 368 F. App'x 640, 647-48 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding in
order to survive summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim, plaintiff must
"produce[] some evidence that the complained-of-actions were motivated by the
exercise of his protected right"; mere "uncivil or even abusive behavior" based on "a
personality conflict" will not suffice). Although proximity alone may be enough to
support a question of fact on whether the plaintiff's protected conduct caused the
retaliation, the time frame separating them must be very short in order to prove
causation without additional evidence. See Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d
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define a retaliatory motive, but it does make the task of disentangling
the retaliatory motive from other, non-retaliatory motivations more
pressing.3 95 The retaliatory motive need not be the sole cause for
what occurred, and another motive may co-exist alongside a
retaliatory motive.396 But proving but-for causation when multiple
motives are involved requires greater clarity about how to define a
retaliatory motive and how to distinguish it from other motives.3 9 7
The narrower the definition of retaliatory motive, the more difficult it
becomes to isolate retaliation as the but-for cause of conduct that is
traceable to multiple motivations.3 98 If retaliatory motive means
animus above and beyond a "normal" desire to support a well-liked
colleague, that could make proof of but-for causation difficult to
establish in a retaliation claim.3 99
This difficulty is present in all retaliation claims, but it is
particularly thorny in coworker retaliation cases due to judges'
understanding of the complexity of coworker emotions and
motivations when confronted with accusations of harassment leveled
against a colleague.40 0 in coworker retaliation cases, courts are quick
to view a coworker's motivation to side with an accused harasser and
protect him from repercussions as a legitimate motive.40
The court in Noviello discussed such motivations by coworkers as
legitimate and distinguished coworker retaliation from coworker
harassment by explaining that in the case of the former, but not the
latter, there is more likely to be a legitimate motivation behind the
coworker's offending conduct.40 2 This legitimate motivation, the
court explained, could include taking the side of the person accused
of harassment and siding against the complainant. 403 Although the
court was not discussing causation specifically, so much as
articulating its understanding of differences in the underlying
motivation in the two claims, the discussion holds important
819, 828 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Even intervals shorter than four months are unlikely,
standing alone, to establish the causation element of a retaliation claim.").
395. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360.
396. See id. at 346-47 (stating that the requirement of but-for causation does not mean that
the retaliatory motive must be the sole cause, but rather that the retaliation would not
have occurred but for the protected activity).
397. See id. at 385 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
398.

See id.

399. See Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1997).
400.

See Porter,supra note 2, at 55.

401.
402.
403.

See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 93 (1st Cir. 2005).
See id. at 87.
Id at 93.
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implications for proof of causation in a coworker retaliation claimespecially after the Nassar decision.4 04 The court assumed that a
retaliatory motive must rise to the level of animus above and beyond
a mere desire to support and defend a person accused of
harassment. 4 05 Unlike status-based harassment, the Noviello court
reasoned that there may be a defensible purpose underlying
retaliatory harassment because "there is nothing inherently wrong . .
with supporting [an accused] friend or" wanting to stay out of the
fray by avoiding the complainant.4 06 Such reasoning narrows what
counts as a retaliatory motive.40 In many cases, it may be difficult to
prove a motive to punish the accuser above and beyond a motive to
side with the accused. 4 0 8 To return to the earlier discussion of social
closure, 4 09 that work shows that closing ranks to show in-group
favoritism is just as pernicious as animus toward the outgroup.4 1 0
The difficulty of parsing an alleged retaliator's desire to punish the
complainant from a motive to support the accused employee may be
difficult when the alleged retaliator is a coworker.4 1 1 With courts
viewing coworker interactions through a lens that highlights the
social nature of the dynamic rather than the professional, 4 1 2 Courts
may be more likely to classify the motive as personal or social,
seeing it as distinct from animus toward the protected conduct.4 13
For example, the court in Sandberg v. Brennan, ruled that the
plaintiff failed to prove causation in her retaliation claim in which:
[A]nother worker [said] that Plaintiff was a 'troublemaker'
in reference to her previous lawsuit. Plaintiff allege[d] that
because of such statements, her coworkers avoided her,
gave her the cold shoulder, or were openly hostile to her . .
[however, the court found the] statement to 'be careful' in
the Plaintiffs presence, in and of itself, does not necessarily

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

Id. at 92.
Id. at 93.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
See Albiston & Green, supra note 68, at 7.
See infra notes 412-16 and accompanying text.

412.

See Rosenbury, supra note 287, at 121-23.

413.

See id. at 125-26.
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indicate a desire to retaliate, but instead could demonstrate a
desire to placate Plaintiff.414
Although causation is a separate doctrinal hurdle from meeting the
standard of severity in Burlington Northern,415 a similar tendency to
separate the social from the professional in analyzing coworker
retaliation may affect judicial approaches to both doctrines, with the
effect of making it harder for plaintiffs to recover.4 16
An additional burden on plaintiffs for proving causation in
coworker retaliation cases, post-Nassar, is disentangling the
retaliatory motives from any discriminatory motives in the
coworker's conduct. 41 7 After Nassar, the presence of possible
discriminatory motives complicates proof of causation on the
retaliation claim, since the protected conduct, and not the protected
class, must be found to be the but-for cause of the challenged
retaliation.418 Prior to Nassar, under a mixed motive framework,
both a retaliatory motive and a sex-based motive might co-exist
without undermining liability for either sexual harassment or
retaliation. 4 19 Following Nassar, the plaintiff must now disentangle
them, showing the retaliatory motive as the but-for cause, in order to
prevail on a retaliation claim.4 20
This sets a high bar regardless of whether the retaliator is a
supervisor or a coworker. 42 1 But in cases involving coworker
retaliation, courts may be particularly likely to attribute
discriminatory motives alongside retaliatory motives.422 This is
because coworker retaliation typically involves harassment 423
coworkers not having the authority to take tangible employment
414.

420.

Sandberg v. Brennan, No. 14-4033 (DWF/HB), 2017 WL 455931, at *4 (D. Minn.
Feb. 2, 2017). The plaintiff was able to survive summary judgment on a separate
retaliation claim by challenging retaliatory acts occurring in a different time period in
response to protected conduct. Id. at *5-6.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
See sources cited supra note 289.
See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360-63 (2013).
See id. at 359-60.
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (holding that "Title VII
meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate considerations"), supersededby statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, tit. I, §
107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)), as recognized in
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014).
See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360.

421.

See id.
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See Reaves, supra note 234, at 404-05.

423.

See id.

415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

46

[Vol. 49

actions424 -and retaliatory harassment can be difficult to distinguish
from sexual harassment. 4 25 As previously mentioned, following the
Supreme Court's decision in Vance, more retaliation allegations than
before will be classified as coworker retaliation,4 2 6 making it all the
more important for retaliation plaintiffs to be able to parse the
retaliatory and discriminatory motives of coworker actions.4 27
Court decisions in coworker retaliation cases have assumed that
retaliatory and discriminatory motives are distinct, requiring
plaintiffs to prove that coworker retaliation was caused by a
retaliatory motive and not merely by a discriminatory motive.4 28 in
Noviello, for example, although the court allowed the sexually hostile
environment and the post-complaint retaliatory harassment to be part
of the same hostile environment for purposes of applying the
continuing violation doctrine for tolling the statute of limitations, the
court asserted that the "majority of cases are not cut from this
seamless cloth," and "[m]ost often" retaliation and sex discrimination
motives are "distinct," with the "intention to punish a person" for
complaining being "a different animus than the sexual animus that
drove the original harassment." 4 29 After scouring the record in that
case, the court asserted that nothing in the record indicated "that the[]
retaliatory acts were undertaken for reasons related to the plaintiffs
gender," insisting instead that they were "two separate and
independent harms." 43 0 The court's understanding of the relationship
between the sexual harassment and retaliation in Noviello enabled it
to hold that an earlier sexually harassing act, which occurred outside
the limitations period, could be folded into a timely retaliatory
harassment claim. 43 1 But the court's discussion of the nature and
relationship between retaliatory and discriminatory motives heralds
difficulties for plaintiffs seeking to prove causation in a post-Nassar
world.4 32
Similarly, in Jensen v. Potter, the court emphasized that to prevail
on a retaliation claim, the reason for the harassment must be
retaliatory animus.4 33 in a passage suggesting a high burden on the

424.
425.

See id.
See id.
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428.
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431.
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See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431-32 (2013).
See supra notes 417-26 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 429-35 and accompanying text.
Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2005).
Id.
See id. at 87-88.
See id. at 86-87.
See Jensenv. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449-50 (3d Cir. 2006).
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plaintiff to parse retaliatory motives from discriminatory ones, the
court explained the following:
[W]hen a woman who complains about sexual harassment is
thereafter subjected to harassment based on that complaint,
a claim that the harassment constitute[s] sex discrimination
(because a man who made such a complaint would not have
been subjected to similar harassment) will almost always
present a question that must be presented to the trier of
fact. 4 34

Linking the harassment that follows the protected activity to a
retaliatory motive may be particularly difficult, if the harassing
coworkers contributed to the sexually harassing environment prior to
the plaintiff's original sexual harassment complaint.43 5
While courts insist on parsing retaliatory motives from
discriminatory ones, the cases themselves demonstrate how
interrelated these motivations actually are.436 Sexism is often at the
root of punishing women for complaining about sexual harassment,
which represents a departure from gender norms that expect women
to remain docile and put up with sexually harassing behaviors.4 37
The facts of Noviello and Jensen show that retaliatory and
discriminatory motives often coincide, and stand in stark contrast to
those courts' insistence on separating discriminatory from retaliatory
motives.4 38
In Noviello, the court insisted that the retaliatory
harassment and the gender-based motives were distinct, 439 but the
facts showed retaliation that was inseparable from the plaintiffs
status as a woman complaining of sexual harassment. 4 4 0 For
example, one of the retaliatory acts taken by coworkers involved a
coworker falsely accusing the complainant of throwing a tampon at
another coworker. 4 4 1 And in Jensen, where the court's discussion of
retaliatory motivation also reflected its assumption that a retaliatory
intent is distinct from a discriminatory one,4 42 the alleged retaliator
434.

Id at 454.
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See id.
See supra notes 428-35 and accompanying text.

437.
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See Reaves, supra note 234, at 408-10.
See Jensen, 435 F.3d at 446-47; see Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 82-83
(1st Cir. 2005).
Noviello, 398 F.3d at 87.
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"the [obscenity] who got [the harasser] in

443

Fact patterns in cases where plaintiffs allege that coworker
retaliation followed a complaint of sexual harassment often involve a
combination of retaliatory and gender-specific post-complaint
harassment.4 4 4
In one district court case alleging coworker
retaliation, Juarez v. Utah, a coworker's negative reactions to a
female dental assistant who filed a sexual harassment complaint
against the male dentist were both punishing and gendered-for
example, telling the plaintiff, who was Latina, after she complained
that she "was good only to do dishes at the office." 4 45 In another
case, Maldonado-Catala v. Municipality of Naranjito, the female
plaintiff was called "machito" (which the court translated as
"manly") and subjected to sexually explicit, threatening, and vulgar
epithets referencing her gender and sexual orientation after she
complained of sexual harassment.44 6 In the latter case, the court
denied summary judgment to the employer on both the sexual
harassment claim and the retaliatory harassment claim, finding that
the "same evidence" could support causation for both retaliatory
animus and gender-based or sexual motivation,44 7 but the court
reiterated that it was the plaintiffs burden to prove that the postcomplaint harassment would not have occurred but for the retaliatory
animus in order to prevail on the retaliation claim.4 48
Ironically, the current state of the law may mean that the more
terrible and overt the sexually discriminatory behavior, the more
difficult it will be for plaintiffs to prove that the post-complaint
harassment would not have occurred but for the retaliatory motive.4 4 9
Instead, a court may view it as a continuation of the earlier sexual
and gender-based motivation.450 On one hand, that makes it harder
for plaintiffs to meet the causation standard necessary to prove
retaliation. 451 Alternatively, if the plaintiff is able to prove but-for
causation for a retaliatory motive, the courts' dichotomous view of
443.
444.
445.
446.

Id. at 447.
See infra notes 445-48 and accompanying text.
Juarez v. Utah, 263 F. App'x 726, 732-33 (10th Cir. 2008).
Maldonado-Catala v. Municipality of Naranjito, 255 F. Supp. 3d 300, 307 (D.P.R.
2015), af'd, 876 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017).
447. Id. at 311.
448. See id. at 317-18.
449. See supra notes 395-399 and accompanying text.
450. See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 86 (1st Cir. 2005).
451. See Aaldonado-Catala, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 320-21 (explaining that long periods of
delay between protected actions and termination can negate the inference of
retaliation).
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retaliatory and sex-based motivation, as either/or and not both, may
mean that classifying the motive as retaliatory may hurt the plaintiff
on a sexual harassment claim, 45 2 especially if the court then fails to
see continuation of harassment post-complaint as proof that the
employer's responsive action was unreasonable. 45 3 The dichotomous
parsing of retaliatory and discriminatory motives, whether it
interferes with proof on the retaliation claim or the sexual harassment
claim, poses a potential downside for the plaintiff either way. 45 4
III. RETALIATION LAW AND #METOO: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AND FOR THE
TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF THE MOVEMENT
The above discussion of how Title VII applies to coworker
retaliation raises two related questions concerning the law's
intersection with the #MeToo movement. 45 5 First, does the #MeToo
movement contain lessons that might shape the development of
retaliation law to better remedy the harms of retaliation by
coworkers? 45 6 Second, will the promise and limits of retaliation law
affect the transformative potential of the movement? 45 7 These
questions are not limited to coworker retaliation, but in keeping with
the focus of this article, the following discussion seeks to highlight
the coworker angle, even as it discusses the movement's relationship
to retaliation law more broadly.4 58
Social movements can have a dramatic impact on how courts
understand and apply the law, even without legislative or regulatory
change.4 59 One tangible indication that #MeToo may be having such
an effect is the Third Circuit's recent decision in Minarsky v.
Susquehanna County, a case involving sexual harassment by a
supervisor. 460 Because the employer had a sexual harassment policy
in place which the plaintiff failed to use to report the harassment, the
district court granted summary judgment to the employer on the
affirmative defense. 46 1 The Third Circuit reversed, citing facts
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.

Cf Noviello, 398 F.3d at 87-88.
See Jensenv. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2006).
Cf Noviello, 398 F.3d at 87-88.
See supra notes 359-61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 362-67 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 480-506 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 459-506 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 2018).
Id.
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showing that the employer was on notice that the same supervisor
had sexually harassed other women, and that the plaintiff testified
that she was afraid to report him because her daughter had cancer and
she relied on her job for medical coverage.46 2 In a remarkable
footnote, the court expressly acknowledged lessons from the #MeToo
movement, stating:
This appeal comes to us in the midst of national news
regarding a veritable firestorm of allegations of rampant
sexual misconduct that has been closeted for years, not
reported by the victims. It has come to light, years later, that
people in positions of power and celebrity have exploited
their authority to make unwanted sexual advances. In many
such instances, the harasser wielded control over the
harassed individual's employment or work environment. In
nearly all of the instances, the victims asserted a plausible
fear of serious adverse consequences had they spoken up at
the time that the conduct occurred. While the policy
underlying Faragher-Ellerth places the onus on the
harassed employee to report her harasser, . . . there may be a
certain fallacy that underlies the notion that reporting sexual
misconduct will end it. Victims do not always view it in this
way. Instead, they anticipate negative consequences or fear
that the harassers will face no reprimand; thus, more often
than not, victims choose not to report the harassment.4 6 3
This alone is a stunning revelation of one court's newfound
skepticism of the assumption underpinning the Faragher-Ellerth
framework, that the reasonable response to harassment is to report
it. 464

But the court went further to cite studies showing that non-

reporting is "pervasive," noting both the prevalence of sexual
harassment in the workplace and a finding from the EEOC task force
that "three out of four women who have been harassed fail to report
it" and instead would "avoid the harasser, deny or downplay the
gravity of the situation, or attempt to ignore, forget, or endure the
behavior." 4 65
Digging deeper, the court listed as reasons for

462. Id. at 307, 3 14-16.
463. Id. at 313 n.12.
464. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998) (citing Faragherv.
Boca Raton 524 U.S. 775 (1998)) (discussing affirmative defenses to a 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) claim).
465.

Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 313 n.12 (citing and quoting EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 3, at v).
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women's non-reporting: "[B]ecause they fear[ed] disbelief of their
claim, inaction on their claim, blame, or social or professional
retaliation." 46 6
Although the Minarsky case did not involve a retaliation claim, the
court's new-found sensitivity to employees' fears of retaliation for
speaking out about sexual harassment reveals that #MeToo has had a
powerful effect on at least a few federal judges in their understanding
of, and empathy for, women's reluctance to report sexual
harassment.46 7 The footnote's window into judges' thinking about
the relationship between reporting sexual harassment and fears of
retaliation suggests that #MeToo holds promise for influencing how
courts apply retaliation law, including to coworker retaliation.4 6 8
In fact, there are several ways that insights from #MeToo might
further shape courts' understanding of Title VII's application to
coworker harassment.4 6 9 Many of the stories of sexual abuse and
harassment show the importance of informal power dynamics, and
not just formal organizational power, in silencing women and
keeping them vulnerable to continued abuse.4 70 Coworkers as well as
higher-ups contribute to a culture of silence. 4 7 1 This observation has
implications for the standard of liability courts apply to coworker
retaliation, insofar as it rejects formally delegated power as the
exclusive means of employer control,47 2 and for the standard for
retaliatory action under Burlington Northern, insofar as it evidences
the chilling effect of coworker responses to complaining. 473 Among
the court's reflections on retaliation in Minarsky, the court included
citations to sources making the point that women are deterred from
reporting sexual harassment by fears of social as well as professional
reactions.47 This observation suggests that courts may be receptive

466. Id.
467. Id. at 313-17 (discussing the reasonableness of plaintiff's failure to report
harassment).
468. Id. at 3 13-14 n.12.
469. See supra notes 60-64, 76-82 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
471. See supra notes 44-45, 73-75 and accompanying text.
472. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
473. See supra notes 292-99 and accompanying text.
474. Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 313 n.12 (3d Cir. 2018) (first citing
EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at v; then citing Stefanie Johnson et al.,
Why We Fail to Report Sexual Harassment, HARV. Bus. REV. (Oct. 4, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/10/why-we-fail-to-report-sexual-harassment
[https://perma.cc/G576-U7LK]; and then citing ABC News/Wash. Post, Unwanted
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to appreciating the blurriness of the boundary between the social and
professional realms.47 5
Another take-away from the #MeToo movement is that the stories
reveal sexual harassment and abuse occurring simultaneously with
silencing and threats to punish reporting. 476 This insight has
implications for both the liability standard for coworker retaliation,
supporting using the same standard for coworker retaliation as for
coworker sexual harassment,4 77 and for the causation analysis,
because it exposes the falsity of a dichotomous view of retaliatory
and sex/gender-based motivation for post-complaint harassment.4 7 8
But there may be limits to how far #MeToo insights can take
retaliation law.479 As #MeToo fatigue sets in, courts may be wary
about pressing employers to go too far in policing complicated
coworker dynamics in reaction to sexual harassment complaints.4 80
Although calibrating a reasonable employer response to known
coworker retaliation should not necessarily be more difficult than
determining employer reasonableness in responding to coworker
sexual harassment, courts may tread lightly into what they view as
the social realm of coworker reactions in the workplace. 48 1 This may
not be an entirely bad thing for the impact of the movement. If
courts pressed too far by censoring expressions of support for the
accused, backlash may ensue, thereby solidifying resistance to
#MeToo rather than changing the norms of sexual abuses of
power.4 82
In calibrating the determination of employer
reasonableness, retaliation law must leave enough space for civil
discourse surrounding #MeToo moments without allowing coworkers
to punish and deter such allegations.4 8 3

Sexual Advances: Not Just a Hollywood Story, ABC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2017, 7:00 AM),
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There is also ambiguity in how #MeToo will affect the standard
under Burlington Northern.4 8 4 One possible interpretation of where
#MeToo has taken mainstream culture is that a normative shift has
occurred, incentivizing the disclosures of sexual harassment so that it
would take more now to deter the telling of these stories than before
#MeToo.4 8 5 It would be unfortunate if the very success of #MeToo
in breaking down the silence surrounding sexual harassment and
abuse resulted in heightening the legal standard for determining what
retaliatory actions are likely to deter a reasonable woman from
speaking up about sexual harassment. A better interpretation, and
one more consistent with the tenor of the movement and with the
purpose of retaliation law to open up the channels of complaint,
would highlight the takeaway from the #MeToo narrative of how
difficult it is to break the code of silence and reveal a sexually
harassing incident.48 6 Many of the #MeToo stories are disclosures
from long ago, revealed well after the woman left the site of the
harassment. 48 7 The avalanche of pent-up stories shows how difficult
it is to speak out in the moment, when action might (at least in
theory) be taken to correct the harassment. 48 8 Despite the impact of
#MeToo, employees who are sexually harassed remain vulnerable to
retribution by coworkers and supervisors to punish and chill
complaints.4 8 9
Whatever effect #MeToo has on the law of retaliation, a related
question is what impact retaliation law will have on the trajectory of
the movement. 49 0 Fear of retaliation has long been the primary force
deterring victims of sexual harassment from speaking out. 49 1 Will
the limited effectiveness of Title VII law constrain how far the
movement can go in promoting disclosures of sexual harassment at
work?
Even if #MeToo pushes retaliation doctrine to be more
encompassing of coworker retaliation, there are limits to how
effectively the law can clear the channels of communicating sexual

484. See supra Section II.B.
485. See Deepti Hajela & Juliet Linderman, 1 Year After MeToo, Survivors Reflect on

Their Disclosures,AP NEWS
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.

(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/5ea53cb20 Ica

415292f5d42bl9e9abec [https://perma.cc/48SE-3UDQ].
See Chira & Einhom, supra note 71.
See Hajela & Linderman, supra note 485.
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See Jodka, supra note 480.
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misconduct in the workplace. 49 2 Retaliation law was designed to
protect official channels of complaining either through the legal
system or the employer's internal reporting channels. 493 To the
extent disclosures are made outside the workplace and on social
media, it will be more difficult to prove employer knowledge, which
is a prerequisite to proving that protected activity was the cause of
retaliatory actions.49 4 Furthermore, it is by no means clear that social
media disclosures would count as protected activity at all, which
Title VII requires to be reasonable in form and proportionate to the
harassment. 49 5 Tweeting about sexual harassment instead of telling a
manager will likely not meet this standard and not rise to the level of
protected conduct.4 9 6
The main import of retaliation law in relation to #MeToo, however,
is in protecting disclosures of sexual harassment-disclosures that
may be inspired by the attention that #MeToo has focused on sexual
harassment-that are made through the proper legal or employercreated channels for reporting. 497 Here too retaliation law can only
promise so much. 498 There has long been a tension between
retaliation law's (and employers') promise of protection from
retaliation and the reality of employer discretion in overseeing the
implementation of internal anti-harassment policies.4 9 9
The
reasonableness of an employer's response will inevitably be
measured with a good dose of judicial appreciation for an employer's
discretionary judgment about how to manage the workplace."oo
There is also the risk that #MeToo may be changing the norms of
appropriate sexual conduct too quickly for the law to keep up.50
Retaliation law protects internal opposition to sexual harassment only
if it is predicated on an objectively reasonable belief that the
underlying conduct was in fact unlawful.50 2 Some of the #MeToo
stories are pushing the boundaries of cultural understanding of sexual
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harms far beyond what the law recognizes as actionable.5 03 The Aziz
Ansari story-although not a story of workplace misconduct-and
the ensuing controversy surrounding it, serves as a reminder of how a
#MeToo narrative can articulate an experience of sexual harm that
goes well beyond the contours of what the law captures. 5 0 4 To the
extent that a more expansive understanding of sexual harm is
emerging from #MeToo, the reasonable belief doctrine might leave
more internal complaints about sexual harm in the workplace
unprotected from retaliation than before.o
In the final analysis, the continuing strength of #MeToo will
depend more on the changing norms of support for telling these
stories than from the scope of legal protection from retaliation.
Perhaps the most we can expect from Title VII when it comes to
coworker retaliation is to set outer limits that pressure employers not
to let negative coworker reactions get too far out of hand.50 6
IV. CONCLUSION
At bottom, one of the biggest explanatory forces behind #MeToo is
the failure of law, not just of sexual harassment law, but of retaliation
law.o
The manifest reluctance to express opposition to sexual
harassment in a timely fashion through workplace channels speaks
volumes about the limits of law in offering meaningful protection
from retaliation at work." The bubbling over of #MeToo stories on
social media, an extralegal channel is, in a very real sense, strong
evidence not just of the failure of the substantive law of sexual
harassment, but also of retaliation law's failure to reassure people
that they are safe to expose such conduct through official legal and
workplace channels. 50 9 In terms of the relationship between law and
social movements, that is both a pessimistic indicator of the limits of
law to fuel social change, and also an optimistic sign that real-world
limits on the ability to reshape law may not, in the end, cause too
503.

See Way, supra note 12.
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See EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 43 (discussing steps employers

should take in order to prevent negative coworker reactions and retaliation from
getting out of hand).
507. See Porter, supra note 2, at 49-50 (discussing the rise of the #MeToo movement and
the failure of retaliation law).
508. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 313 n.12 (3d Cir. 2018).
509. See Vedantam, supra note 61 (discussing Facebook, Twitter, and Google as powerful
tools to connect victims and reassure people they are safe to expose offensive
conduct).
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great a hindrance to the deepening of the movement.5 10 Seen in that
light, the difficulty retaliation law has encountered in policing
coworker retaliation in particular may not spell doom for the
continuation of the #MeToo narratives after all."'
Retaliation law can only do so much to shield complainants from
the daggers and darts of coworker hostility.5 12 Nevertheless, it can
and should do better at setting outer boundaries to police coworker
retaliatory targeting at work.5 1 3 Better tailoring of retaliation law to
recognize the harms of coworker retaliation may help nudge
workplace norms, and by extension social norms, away from
punishing responses and toward constructive dialogue; thereby
discouraging efforts to shut down disclosures of sexual
harassment.5 14
The ultimate issue underlying the question of how retaliation law
should respond to the #MeToo movement is how much the law
should protect these stories. 1
Any judgment about the
reasonableness of an employer's response to retaliatory responses to
sexual harassment allegations, 5 16 the severity of retaliatory
harassment required to violate Title VII, 51" and the stringency
required for proof of causation, 1 must be informed by the value of
bringing such allegations to light. At the end of the day, these
doctrinal choices depend on how much space we think the law should
protect for calling out sexual harassment at work. Recently, New
York Times columnist David Brooks cautioned that "call out
culture"-an implicit reference to #MeToo-represents a feudal
vigilante justice that weakens communal social ties and drains the
empathy and nuance necessary for a healthy society .519
This
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perspective should not be too quickly dismissed: Brooks articulates
real risks that black and white stories of villains and victims
oversimplify and polarize, where empathy and understanding are
needed for lasting normative change.5 20 But Brooks's account
understates the value of #MeToo-inspired complaints of sexual
harassment at work.5 2 1 The deluge of #MeToo stories represents the
failure of law and civil discourse at work, and the turn to social
media for telling these stories indicates the failure of other channels
to provide support and justice.5 2 2 In order to have more due process
in the course of deciphering contested allegations, and more civility
in the discourse around them, we need more-not less-space for
telling accounts of sexual harassment in settings where accountability
and redress are possible.5 23
The critique of #MeToo "call out" culture also misses something
important about the value of narratives of sexual harm.5 24 The power
of the narratives lends believability and credibility to the stories of
women and sexual harm, which have long been vulnerable to
discrediting tactics.5 25 It has always been easy to dismiss the lone
woman who comes forward to accuse a powerful man of sexual
harassment.5 2 6 This skepticism affects girls and women of any age
and in virtually any setting where sexual misconduct is
encountered. 5 2 7 In the foundational case recognizing peer sexual
harassment as a violation of Title IX, for example, the principal
responded to the 5th grade girl's repeated complainants of sexual
harassment from a 5th grade boy by asking, doubtfully, why she was
the only one complaining. 528 The me too part of #MeToo has been
critical for bolstering the believability of girls and women coming
forward with stories of sexual harm. 529 That need not, as Brooks
fears, force absolutist claims to believe all women. 53 0 Nor need
#MeToo devolve into false equivalencies of a wide range of sexual
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harms nor dehumanize all purveyors of sexual harm.5 3 1 Feminists,
and the culture at large, have the capacity for nuanced moral
judgment and tolerance for ambiguity when the truth is elusive.53 2
Perhaps most importantly, the critique of #MeToo as vigilante
justice fails to account for the healing power of the stories themselves
for the survivors who tell them.5 3 3 We should remember that the
originator of #MeToo, Tarana Burke, founded the movement,
focusing on black girls and women, for its collective therapeutic
power to heal the scars of long-suppressed sexual abuse.53 4 Calls for
repercussions for the perpetrators of abuse came much later, and are
not the only value of #MeToo disclosures.53 5
The deeply personal narratives of #MeToo have forced people far
and wide to take notice of, and try to understand and empathize with,
survivors of sexual harassment and abuse.5 3 6 They have deepened
our cultural understanding of the injuries of sexual misconduct, with
the potential to generate social change to make these harms less
common, particularly for younger generations.5 37 Retaliation law
may not be able to fully protect future sexual harassment claimants
who are inspired by #MeToo to tell their stories, but insights from the
movement have the potential to make the law at least a moderately
better fit.53 8 Particularly when it comes to retaliation by coworkers,
long the stepchild of retaliation law, Title VII has room to grow, and
lessons from #MeToo can help light the way.53
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